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ABSTRACT
O’CONNOR, ELIZABETH The Stability of the Transatlantic Alliance in the 21st
Century: The Impact of the Development of European Union Foreign Policy in
Comparison to American Objectives. Department of Political Science, June 2008.
This thesis explores the history of the transatlantic alliance since World War II in
conjunction with the unification and development of the European Union, particularly
examining the stability of the alliance, as the EU has become a major global actor
economically and politically. The foreign policies of EU/US international interventions
are examined in a pre and post- September 11th context, focusing on the Balkan crisis and
the Bush administration’s Global War on Terrorism.
The European Union, often referred to as “an economic giant but political dwarf,”
declared its intention to develop a common European foreign policy (CFSP) in 1992.
Focused on ‘soft power’ and multilateralism, the EU lead the negotiations as conflict first
broke out in the former Yugoslavia. However, an EU position was not solidified by this
point and their lack of military clout to back up negotiations failed to ease the conflict.
The US militarily intervened and was successful in negotiating the Dayton Peace
Accords. The post- September 11th case study suggests that foreign policy in a
globalizing world should be more focused on the promotion of ‘soft power’ and the use
of multilateralism. The US focus on ‘hard power,’ based on Cold War tactics, is out of
date and has only proven to be detrimental to our objectives and post- 9/11 world image.
It is therefore suggested that to be more internationally effective and to improve relations
with the EU, the new US presidential administration should abstain from the Bush
administration’s hegemonic policy and instead promote more ‘soft power’ tactics and
multilateral cooperation.
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Introduction
…no important problem in the world can be resolved without the joint
efforts of the United States and Europe; no problem is unsolvable
when we confront it together. 1

…structurally the bonds that link the Union to the United States are
still mutually important- in terms of trade, investment and more or
less common political philosophies. But room for conflict
over…differing conceptions of how to promote the political good life
may also make for tension. 2

Since the end of World War II the American/ Western European alliance has
strengthened throughout the post war reconstruction of the continent. Since this time
European solidarity has also unified, coming together to develop the European Union into
an ‘economic giant’. Yet despite increased political integration, the EU has long been
considered a political dwarf. The lack of a European political identity has reinforced the
EU’s military reliance on the United States. Throughout the 1990s the EU has voiced its
commitment to developing a Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP). The eagerness of
the EU to speak with one voice, independent to that of the United States’, has influenced
the perception of a faltering relationship. In analyzing the evolution of EU foreign policy,
particularly regarding a pre-and post- 9/11 context, the emergence of European values
and objectives emerge- most notably in terms of the Iraq war. It seems that throughout
the Bush administration’s Global War on Terrorism, EU member states, although initially
divided, have converged in opposition to Bush’s unilateral and hegemonic policies. The

1

Parsi, Vittorio Emanuele. The Inevitable Alliance: Europe and the United States Beyond Iraq. 2nd ed. New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. Page 1.
2
Smith, Hazel. European Union Foreign Policy: What it is and what it does. London: Pluto Press, 2002.
Page 272.
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subsequent distrust of US policy and perceived lack of legitimacy of America’s role in
international affairs is evident among Europeans and has provided the basis for the
atrophy of the alliance.
I believe that analyzing the deterioration of the alliance in regard to Europe’s
developing political identity, compared to that of the United States, shows significant
implications on the future of the individual members themselves. The 9/11 terrorist
attacks and subsequent focus on Islamic terrorism suggests that the 21st century is
evolving from a post-Cold War context to an increased globalization of international
relations. In this sense of globalizing relations and security threats, the Bush
administration’s post-9/11 hegemonic policies have actually proved counter effective to
US agenda of defeating terrorism by increasing instability in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Furthermore, Europe’s ‘soft power’ principles of economic development to stop terrorism
at its roots have proven to be more effective than Bush’s declaration of “war” on
terrorism. As a result, the EU’s image as a global actor has increased in credibility at the
expense of the US reputation. The preservation and bolstering of transatlantic ties are
significant in terms of the stability of America’s global role. With the power and
international influence of the US slowly decreasing as Europe’s is only increasing,
strengthening the relationship and facilitating collaboration with the EU will help to
increase the legitimacy of the US. Therefore, the US must learn from their European
allies to employ more multilateral ‘soft power’ tactics to their foreign policy agenda.
In Chapter 1, an examination of the historical evolution of the transatlantic
alliance and the parallel development of the European Union since World War II are
examined. This provides the context for the historically strong American/European
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partnership while inferring the strengthening of relations within the EU itself during this
time.
Chapter 2 lays out the recent results of the Lisbon Reform Treaty. The passing of
the 2007 Lisbon Treaty all but in name marks the passage of the 2004 constitution, since
90% of the constitution is represented in the treaty. This treaty’s establishment of a High
representative of Foreign Affairs and Security Policy illustrates the increased
solidification EU foreign policy, and their ambition to play a larger role in international
relations. The foreign policies and political values of the EU and US are also examined in
this chapter, revealing differences in the objectives of the EU and US. Essentially, the EU
has been more focused on ‘soft power’ negotiations employed through multilateral
institutions, whereas the US has been more inclined to act unilaterally with the use of
‘hard power’ force.
Chapter 3 examines the post-communist EU and US crisis interventions in the
Balkan region. This pre- 9/11-based intervention chapter identifies the EC initial control
of mediating the Croatian independence struggle and Bosnian conflict. The EU’s inability
to unify on a position to effectively mitigate the crisis suggests the failure of a premature
CFSP. The subsequent US control of the crisis only confirmed the EU’s subordinate role
in foreign affairs to that of the US and UN. Soon after the US took control, they were
able to negotiate the Dayton Peace Agreements. After the EU failed to alleviate the
conflict in Bosnia they aimed to further develop the CFSP, thus making it more effective
in dealing with the crisis in Macedonia.
Chapter 4 addresses a shift toward more globalizing international relations and
examines the US and EU positions in the US-led Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The

6

detrimental impact of US increased unilateralism and hegemony became clear as the
GWOT progressed. This led not only to the debate between the EU and US on
appropriate military action, with the US advocating pre-emptive strike, but also to an
intra-EU debate which essentially divided the continent in two. As the failures of US
policy and tactics of fighting terrorism with solely ‘hard power’ became apparent, the EU
emphasis of combating terrorism at its roots with ‘soft power’, was implied to be the
more successful policy in a globalized international order. European and global public
opinion turned against the US as its failure in Iraq became apparent, thus further
undermining the transatlantic alliance.
Post-9/11 analysis of intervention clearly represents the United States’ strong
military capacity but lack of legitimizing ‘soft power’ authority. On the other hand, post9/11 EU objectives have suggested Europe’s military weakness but presence of the
legitimizing power of morality and international law. With the EU and US possessing the
tactical strength of that which the other lacks, a future of less US unilateralism and more
coordination of resources would presumably optimize EU and US effectiveness in
international affairs. More US equal dialogue with the EU along with less emphasis on
militaristic force would attempt to begin a refortification of the transatlantic alliance.
I therefore suggest that the United States, perhaps under the new 2008
administration, abandon their unilateral hegemonic agenda and incorporate more
cooperation with the EU on an equal and multilateral level to thereby bolster the EU/US
partnership.

7

History of American/European Relations and the Unification of the
European Continent After World War II
Europe and the United States have traditionally had strong ties. Although there
were rough times between the two powers in colonial history, the 20th century was mainly
characterized by a strong US commitment to European affairs. During World War I, an
isolated United States joined the war on behalf of her British, French, and Russian Allies.
In 1941 the United States exhibited a similar tendency to intervene in support of the
British, French, and Russians. After World War II much of Europe was devastated by the
violence the continent endured. The nations were in political disarray, militarily feeble,
and economically in need of rejuvenation. 3 The United States recognized that
regenerating Europe was just as essential to its security as it was to Europe’s.
The 1947 Marshall Plan was essentially a US economic aid program to “build up
not only the victors allied with it but also, for the sake of the future of Europe, the losers
(Germany, Austria, and Italy).” 4 The Soviet Union saw the Marshall Plan as an
“instrument of imperialism” 5 and thus a threat to their influence over Eastern European
nations. The Soviet Union created Cominform, a plan similar to the Marshall plan but
intended for Eastern European states, to prevent US aid from being implemented in those
nations. “The Marshall Plan therefore spurred the satellization process in the countries
occupied by the Red Army.” 6 It was clear the former allies of WWII, united against the

3

Milloy, John. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 1948-1957. 1st. Montreal: McGill-Queen's
Univeristy Press, 2006. Page 3
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Kotlowski, Dean. The European Union: From Jean Monnet to the Euro. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University
Press, 2000. Page 76.
5
De Senarclens, Pierre. From Yalta to the Iron Curtain. Oxford: Berg Publishers Limited, 1995. Page 233.
6
Ibid Page 227.
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common Nazi enemy, were drifting and the ideological differences between them would
only sharpen this divide.
Both the United States and Europe realized the need to rebuild Europe and
promote an organization to diminish the threat of another world war. The United Nations
was founded in 1945 to replace the League of Nations and aimed to “see nations achieve
a higher standard of living, find a solution to social, economic, and medical problems,
and observe human rights.” 7 Europe, along with the international system, needed to
reform to ensure international security and the protection of human rights. The United
Nations seemed to do just that, but the United States and Western Europe recognized that
with the threat of the Soviet Union their alliance also needed the backing of a
supranational system.
The Yalta and Potsdam conferences essentially gave way to the descent of the
iron curtain enclosing the countries occupied by the Soviet Union at the end of the war.
By 1945 the “Soviet Union was consolidating its own sphere of influence” 8 in the
countries it occupied, guiding their governmental systems and economies toward
communism. With the origins of the Cold War stemming from dividing Europe into
communist and democratic nations, the US and many western European nations began to
realize the importance of a strong alliance.

As Winston Churchill stated, an “Iron

Curtain” now divided the East from the West. 9 And “perhaps the most important idea
shared by the governments stemmed from the East-West division of the continent: there

7
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was a determination to preserve Western Europe from communism.”10 The United States
clearly shared this concern, in 1947 Truman issued the Truman doctrine “which
amounted to a political guarantee of support to ‘free peoples who are resisting attempted
subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.’” 11 Soon after, in 1949, the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was developed, in essence, to counter the
communist threat and provide US military protection against Soviet attack. British
foreign secretary Ernest Bevin called to strengthen Western Europe’s “ability to resist
communism while building upon its long-term military preparedness.” 12
This counterbalance to communism came in the form of the March 1948 Treaty of
Brussels which included France, Britain, and the Benelux powers. 13 Equally important to
Bevin was a military alliance with the United States to bolster Western Europe’s military
capabilities and “provide an umbrella under which the Brussels treaty system could
develop.” 14 NATO was intended to achieve more than just military cohesion but was also
an economic, political, and psychological security system to counter the lure of
communism. 15 United behind a new common threat, the spread of communism, the
United States and Western Europe furthered their commitment to each other which had
been fortified in WWI and WWII.
The formation of NATO was intended to strengthen the transatlantic alliance and
to counter the Soviet communist threat. The deal essentially was “that the United States
would contribute to the defense of Europe and to Europe’s economic recovery from the
10
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war if the Europeans would organize themselves to help defend against the Soviet threat
and use the economic aid efficiently.” 16 Although organizationally there was political
unity between the US, Western Europe, and Canada, in reality there were different
notions of perceived threats. The United States, on one side of the Atlantic, was mainly
concerned with the Soviet threat while countries like France, still afflicted by the
memories of WWII, was primarily focused on the German threat. “The conflict between
French and American priorities could not have been sharper…French vision remained
fixed on the ‘German problem’, which it hoped to solve once and for all by denying
Germany the armed forces with which it could once again threaten France.” 17
This point of contention was soon addressed when North Korea attacked South
Korea in 1950. “The Korean War, seen as demonstrating the global threat of communist
aggression, provided the political momentum required to overcome congressional
resistance to a substantial deployment of US ground forces in Europe.” 18 The reality of
the spread of communism not only influenced the US to deploy troops in Europe, but also
made them put pressure on Western Europe to undertake massive rearmament. This
naturally exacerbated the French’s perceived threat of German re-armament but the US
realized that German military strength was essential to continental defense to “provide
sufficient ground forces to balance the Soviet Union in central Europe.” 19 The
rearmament of Germany was not easily accepted throughout Western Europe but it was
finally agreed upon that, “the United States had gained French adherence to at least the

16
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idea of German rearmament. The French gained an immediate American military
commitment to the defense of Europe while delaying the rearming of Germany.” 20
This rapid rearmament threatened the post-war economic recovery, overseen by
the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC). This introduced a debate
as to the impact of NATO versus the OEEC in post-war re-development of Western
Europe. Finally an informal OEEC-NATO committee was developed to facilitate
economic cooperation. 21 From this, the European Defense Community (EDC) was
formed to ensure military effectiveness and to “reassure France against future German
power and to provide a constructive framework for the creation of a united Europe.” 22
Although the EDC eventually became ineffective and essentially enforced by NATO, it
did serve as “a useful agent for advancing the agenda of integration” in Western
Europe. 23 Thus the Korean War and the threat of communism in many ways brought
about radical changes to the organization of NATO and its relationship with the OEEC
along with an attempt at a more unified Europe. 24
Unifying Western Europe:
As has been stated, World War II left Europe bruised and shaken. But within this
political disarray there was a sense of optimism between the Western European nations
that a catastrophe of that nature could be avoided in the future. This led to the post war
institution building that eventually led to the deep integration of the modern day

20
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European Union. The formation of the European Union took a lot of time and initiative
by many member states.

Just as the US and Western European powers noted the

importance of a strong alliance against the common communist threat, these European
countries also realized the value in a Western European partnership.
Around the same time of the formation of NATO, in May 1948, 750 prominent
Europeans met in The Hague and called upon the nations of Europe to create a political
and economic union. One year later the Statue of the Council of Europe was signed by
ten European states.

25

Among the agreements of the Council of Europe was a “common

action in economic, social, cultural, scientific, legal and administrative matters and in the
maintenance and further realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms.” 26
Although the Council of Europe was ultimately unsuccessful, the cooperation among
states did set a standard for a future coalition among Western European powers.
In all of the efforts to unify Western Europe economically and politically after
World War II, it seems that France was the pivotal actor in rallying support and
advocating for this partnership. It seems that just as the UK was the largest European
supporter of NATO, France had been the leader behind Western European
institutionalization. “Experts agree that European cooperation took the shape it did in the
1950s-the institutionally strong, geographically limited EEC-above all because the
French government demanded it.” 27 Other nations such as Britain, Germany, and the
Benelux nations, seemed to favor a more broader and weaker institution. 28 Britain’s
25
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stance comes as no surprise, however Germany and the Benelux nations were clearly
swayed by the French suggesting that the French were the most pivotal voice in the
creation of European institutions. The French eagerness to form a European Community
seems to make sense in a post-war historical context. Of all the Western European states,
France was arguably one of the most devastated countries after World War II. This could
be one of the main reasons for France’s “community mindedness” and insistence on
preserving democracy and promoting cooperation between Western European states.
France’s perseverance for a strengthened and more unified Western European
bloc can be explained by many of the governmental concepts of the time. In March 1949
Jean Monnet, often considered the ‘founding father’ of the EU, 29 stated that at that time
“Western Europe was a vacuum, on either side were the two great dynamic forces of
communism and American capitalism…This vacuum could be filled either by one of
these two outside forces or by the development of a Western European ‘way of life.” 30
Monnet perceived the inadequacy of the current European institution, the OEEC, which
consisted of too many sovereign nations and could not “consider European problems in a
European way.” 31 The French saw the need for Western Europe to evolve into a more
unified power. The British, on the other hand, felt that they should not “go further in the
way of integration with the French than seemed wise from the economic point of
view…we should not agree…to anything which would render us incapable of sustaining

29
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an independent resistance if France were overrun.” 32 This statement clarified the British
reluctance to further integrate Western Europe on a “supranational” level.
With the strong British and American partnership, and Britain’s unwillingness to
give up sovereignty, France realized their goal would have to be met without British
participation. The 1950 Shuman Plan, proposed by French Foreign Minister Robert
Shuman and masterminded by Jean Monnet led to the signing of the Treaty of Paris in
1951, establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). 33 This essentially
laid the groundwork for the European Union of today. Although it did involve other
countries, the ECSC was essentially an agreement between France and Germany. The
French postwar goal of keeping Germany weak while rebuilding French strength seems
far from “community minded”. But, through this agreement it seems the French were
willing to see German rehabilitation as long as it was under their supervision. “In return
for fostering German reconstruction and reindustrialization, France sought a framework
for planned production and distribution in its own coal and steel industry.” 34

This

agreement not only improved trust between the French and the Germans, but also
bolstered defense against communism with the outbreak of the Korean War. 35
One significant factor in this agreement was the institutionalization of an
intergovernmental decision-making body responsible for policy initiation and
management of the agreement. This supranational executive body is considered the

32
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“Monnet method” and provided the model for future treaties. 36 The formation of the
ECSC with Germany signifies France’s backing away from seeking British support and
instead leading their own agenda in the creation of a united Western European bloc.
Charles De Gaulle perceived that “the United States had entered an era of imperialism
and colonial expansion, and Churchill, with incredible malice, had turned Britain into an
American dominion.” 37 De Gaulle saw the need for “a Western federation…to defend the
values of European civilizations against the Americans, and if necessary the Russians.” 38
While De Gaulle and Monnet both saw the need for a European institution, De Gaulle
seemed to take on more of an anti-American stance than other French politicians at the
time.
Although many Europeans, French alike, could not see “a Europe without Great
Britain,” 39 the French had convinced the previously skeptical nations to form a strong
Western European block. In the case of the Benelux countries, whose vulnerability was
emphasized in the Second World War, not one of these states “was in a strong enough
position to ignore Franco-German initiatives for economic integration.” 40 In the case of
Italy, European integration offered the prospect of a new beginning after Fascism. 41 In
1957, six Western European nations France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, and Italy, came together to further the economic partnership that France and
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Germany had created. The 1958 Treaty of Rome established the European Economic
Community (EEC) along with the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). 42
The EEC Treaty set up a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) to protect
agricultural products and establish a common market. 43 The common market unified the
six nations more closely than ever before by reducing tariffs and establishing the free
movement of goods, persons, services, and capital among the member states.44 Euratom,
also formulated by Jean Monnet, was an institution to promote the peaceful use of atomic
energy. This institution was “founded first on the hesitation of the United States to share
its uranium and then to the desire of France to keep its military options open.” 45 Euratom
did provide advancements and diversification in the fields in which the six nations
unified however there was a loophole for national secrecy in order to preserve national
security. The Treaty of Paris, signed in 1951, along with the 1958 Treaty of Rome
dictated the future of the “vacuum” of Western Europe. As Monnet envisioned, France,
Germany, Italy, and the Benelux nations came together institutionally and formed an
economically united bloc. This not only bolstered their economies but also enabled them
to stand up to what Monnet referred to as the two great powers on either side of it, Soviet
communism and American capitalism.
Deepening of the EEC through Political Unity:
Established in 1958, the EEC has come a long way from its six member economic
community to taking on political integration as well. In the 1969 Hague Summit EU
42
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member states began to focus on non-binding foreign policy coordination. Even after De
Gaulle’s resignation in April of 1969, France, under Georges Pompidou, still played a
large role in setting the agenda and leading the EEC in the direction of further
unification. 46 This Hague summit agreed to granting membership to four applicant
countries, Britain, Denmark, Ireland, and Norway. With the addition of four new member
states occurring in 1973, the founding members vowed to continue to strengthen and
deepen the institution. 47 Also on the agenda for the 1969 Summit were the issues of
enlargement, economic and monetary union, and political union.
The 1970 Luxembourg report brought the concept of political union into fruition.
The European Political Cooperation (EPC) was instituted in 1970 aiming to coordinate
the foreign policy of EU member states and to “speak with a single voice in world
affairs.” 48 But unlike the ever-developing economic integration of this time, the EPC was
“relatively inward-looking” 49 and did not actually address many issues in its first decade.
This may have stemmed from the fact that while most of the member states were willing
to sacrifice some economic sovereignty for long term financial gain, this was not true in
terms of political matters. The EPC did not actually hold much clout because any hint of
a formalized EU foreign policy “which could be seen or portrayed as abrogating the
sovereignty of member states, particularly on the sensitive areas of security and defense,
was rebuffed.” 50 At this point, the member states were not willing to give up political
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sovereignty to create an effective foreign policy institution, something that is still being
attempted today.
In fact, even after the implementation of the EPC it is evident that the institution
was minimally effective. Only a few security related issues were discussed in the
meetings of the early 1970’s such as Middle East and East-West relations, and few
concrete policy decisions were actually made. 51 Within the first decade of the formation
of the EPC, less than twenty foreign policy actions such as economic sanctions were
made. 52 Although the EPC was not particularly influential in terms of political actions, it
was effective in the creation of a common European political identity. For example, in
the Middle Eastern dialogue the Danish and the Germans generally favored an Israeli
approach but gradually moved toward the EPC position which was more pro-Arab. 53 The
EPC provided the arena for dialogue that brought some member states with outlying
perspectives to a more moderate position consistent with most of the other EC states.
Although the EPC was effective in swaying the positions of some EC member states, it
seems that many of the EC nations were still focused on defense through the NATO
framework rather than the EPC.
It is not to say that the member states were ignorant to the futility of the EPC.
After its formation, many reports were conducted in an attempt to improve foreign policy
cooperation between the states. The 1972 Paris Summit and the 1973 Copenhagen Report
issued more detailed procedural frameworks, increasing the duties and meetings of
foreign ministers and making the “Luxembourg model” of intergovernmental procedures
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the standard practice. 54 This “Luxembourg model” refers to the appointment of officials
to the European Assembly from each member state with the notion that each nation
“possesses a distinct ‘European Identity’ in the field of international relations” in order to
achieve a truly common foreign policy. 55 The EPC was becoming increasingly mature
throughout the 1970s with the implementation of new reports and documents broadening
the duties of the institution practically on a yearly basis.
The London Report of 1981 expanded the actions and the functional issues which
the EPC dealt with. Debates in the 1980s on Community foreign policy concluded the
further development of a foreign policy tool. “The Community’s foreign policy became
enshrined in two international treaties- the 1987 Single European Act (SEA) and the 1993
Treaty on European Union.” 56 The SEA is often described as “heralding the ‘re-launch’
of European integration in that it provided the foundations for a considerable increase in
the pace of integration.” 57 Continuing this trend of increased integration, the Maastricht
Treaty of 1992 fortified the three-pillar system of the European Union, which still exists
today. The new organization of the EU was based around the three pillars: the European
Communities, a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and Cooperation in the
Fields of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). 58 This treaty also progressed the agenda of the
Economic Monetary Union (EMU) by instituting a single currency, the Euro. With the
establishment of the European Union, the Maastricht Treaty explicitly stated for the first
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time that the Union was “to be founded on the principles of democracy and fundamental
human rights.” 59
The transition from the EPC to the CFSP fortified the European Union’s foreign
policy goals and increased its involvement in conflict prevention/democratization
processes. This is seen extensively in the Central/Eastern European states, the
Mediterranean region, the former Soviet states, South Africa, Central America and
elsewhere. 60 One of the most significant advances in the formation of the CFSP is that it
“laid the groundwork for the use of police or military forces in certain areas, which now
includes plans for a European rapid reaction force.” 61 This development is a clear
instance of EU member states sacrificing some of their sovereignty and pooling their
recourses for the collective good of EU to be a more proactive foreign policy instrument.
“EU foreign policy has moved from protecting the EU from the unilateral
foreign policy actions of its members to acting with a single purpose in
world politics to serve common goals. This development…reflects an
institutionalized transition from the narrow instrumental rationality behind
the creation of the EPC to the more socially driven of a common
interest.” 62
Since the formation of the ECSC in 1952, the postwar Western European
partnership has clearly evolved from a relatively weak six state partnership, into a
twenty-seven member deeply integrated union. As Smith states, the EU has
transformed into a socially driven entity in which most aspects of European life
are addressed by the EU rather than on a nation-to-nation basis. 63 This collective
effort has transformed Europe into an economic giant but on the other hand, many
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contrast the integrated economy with the nominal “common foreign policy”.
Thus, the EU is labeled an economic giant but a political dwarf.
The economic success of the EU and relative political failure of the
institution could be explained by the fact that upon the formation of the EC, the
founding fathers’ main concern was the economic development of Western
Europe. Political unification through the EPC and eventually CFSP seems to have
come about as an after thought of the economic success of the region. This is
sustained by the “Monnet method” which formed the basis of European
integration. “This method, often identified with the social science theory known
as ‘functionalism.’ favored promoting economic integration in specific sectors,
with the notion that this would produce ‘spillovers’ into other sectors and
eventually create both the need and the momentum for political integration.” 64 It
therefore comes as no surprise that the political unification of the EU is not as
advanced as the economic sphere.
This leads to the question, is political unification and a common foreign
policy intended and even practical for the EU? This concept of “what Europe is”
has certainly been debated among EU member states. Furthermore, it has been
suggested that, “European integration is like riding a bike- unless you keep
moving forward, you will fall off…because European integration has been viewed
as a journey rather than a destination, there is enormous ambiguity about precisely
where it is heading.” 65 Congruent with the “spillover” concept, it seems that the
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EU will continue ‘riding the bike of integration’ thus moving forward with further
integration and over time leading to a common foreign policy.
Many of the EU member states are aiming to change the concept of the
EU as a ‘political dwarf’. In general, there has been an increasing acceptance of
European states promoting cooperation in foreign policy. The 2007 EU
Constitution would have brought about a more clear and effective foreign policy
however, it was rejected by referendum by French and Dutch voters. This dissent
within the EU suggests that despite all of the advances in political unity in Europe
since World War II, it will likely be a matter of time before the status of a truly
effective common foreign policy is decided upon in the EU.
The Future of the Alliance:
The United States and Western European nations have shared a common history,
but recently it seems that their historic partnership is on the rocks. Throughout World
War II the US, Britain, and France allied against their common enemy of the axis powers.
Even after WWII, the US played a major role in the development of Western Europe and
the promotion of democracy in the area. The political polarization of the Cold War
further united democratic Europe and the US against their communist enemy. But with
the diminished Soviet threat, the EU and US are no longer united against one common
cause and the question remains, does EU and US still have enough common interests to
keep a strong alliance?
The destruction of Europe by the end of World War II created the need for a
united Western European democratic bloc. This unification was encouraged and
essentially funded by the US and advanced Western Europe while Eastern Europe
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declined economically. “The Second World War unquestionably marked a turning point
in the West European state system. Just a few years after the end of the war, states were
cooperating, and…were even integrating, in a manner that would have been
inconceivable before the war.” 66 It is clear that WWII exacerbated the need for a unifying
system that eliminated the possibility of war between European states. NATO, along with
the formation of the EC provided the means to this goal. The US Marshall Plan, as
previously discussed, provided the funds that allowed for this economic redevelopment.
The United States is often criticized for asserting its power on ‘weaker’ nations.
However, the implementation of the Marshall Plan seems to have been more on the basis
as an amicable act out of a democratic alliance rather than a domination tactic. “The role
for the United States in Western Europe at this time should not be seen as having been
unwelcome… US aid was not insidiously imposed on unwilling states but was actively
sought.” 67 The US/ Western European alliance at this time was truly a mutually
expedient relationship, the US helped facilitate the rebuilding of Western Europe while
gaining a pivotal ally against Soviet communism. The time period after WWII could
arguably be when the United States and Western Europe’s alliance was strongest. This
seems to have been a time of true partnership in which both sides of the Atlantic
converged against the communist threat and focused on their common historical culture
throughout the beginning of the Cold War.
The further integration of the European Community throughout the 1960s and
1970s, led to more cooperation between the member states along with a more succinct
European ‘voice’ in global matters. The NATO framework was still essential to the
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defense of Europe, but the role of the EC was becoming increasingly more important.
Similarly, as the Cold War progressed, the US and EC political perspectives began to
diverge. The EC’s Document on the European Identity (1973) aimed to unite its members
with one voice in international affairs. The EC was pulling away from diplomatically
operating in the United States’ shadow because throughout the 1970’s the two were
beginning to hold different perspectives in terms of political and economic issues. “The
Europeans and US disagreed on Vietnam, international monetary relations and the
relative merits of Israeli and Palestinian claims in the 1973 October war.”
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It comes as

no surprise that the divisions between the US and EC came at a time when the EC was in
the beginning stages of political unity. As the EC was developing its own political
identity, the differences in US/EC perspectives were becoming increasingly apparent.
The US now had to adapt the way it conducted relations with Western European states in
terms of negotiating on a supranational level rather than on a nation-to-nation basis. In
1973, Kissinger had wanted to organize a new economic, political and defense
relationship between the US and UK. In the process Kissinger insulted the efficacy of the
EC by “relegating the Europeans to the status of junior partner as he insisted that the US
had global interests to protect while the Europeans possessed only regional interests.” 69
This statement clearly devalued the efforts of the EPC to bolster Europe’s voice in
international relations while discrediting the role of the EC in the transatlantic
partnership.
Belittling the role of Europe in the US/EC alliance undermined the partnership
and only made the EC more focused on strengthening Europe’s role in international
68
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relations. In this, the EC was faced with the dilemma of how to keep a strong transatlantic
alliance while promoting a separate EU political voice, “European Political Cooperation
was based upon US security leadership within NATO and yet at the same time was an
effort by the West Europeans to maintain an international political identity distinct from
that of the United States.” 70 Since the United States role in NATO was so essential to
Europe’s security the institution and effectiveness of NATO had to be upheld, however,
the US and European perspectives were beginning to diverge.
The future of the EU/US relationship has been frequently debated. In the recent
years it seems, more than ever, that the transatlantic gap is widening. With the success
and integration of the EU in economic and political terms, the EU is increasingly defining
its own objectives in international relations.
Europe seems to be turning away from supremacy and is more focused on the
promotion of peace through intergovernmental institutions, while the US is content with
its role and domination as a superpower. Robert Kagan goes as far as to suggest that
“Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus” 71 Kagan proposes that
Europe “is moving beyond power and into a self-contained world of laws and rules and
transnational negotiation and cooperation…the realization of Kant’s ‘Perpetual Peace.’” 72
While the United States on the other hand, “exercises power in an anarchic Hobbesian
world where international laws and rules are unreliable and where true security and the
defense and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of
military might.” 73 Evidence does suggest that the EU and US do favor differing foreign
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policy instruments. The EU is generally more likely to impose sanctions in order to
influence other nations while the US is more inclined to use military power.
Although the EU and US seem to be developing differing perspectives on
international relations, are the two powers as different as Kagan suggests? Or does the
1973 Document on the European Identity stating that “the close links between the US and
EC member states, based on shared ‘values and aspirations founded on a common
heritage’” 74 still hold true? Furthermore, if the transatlantic gap is actually growing and
the EU intends to institute a clear and effective common European foreign policy, what
does this mean for the future of the EU/US relationship?
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The Fortification of a European Political Identity: examination of
US/EU foreign policy in a globalizing world
The fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War marked a disintegration
of the foreign policy tools and objectives of the United States and much of Europe. With
their common enemy and security threat diminished, the US and EU began taking on new
global outlooks. Although in many ways the alliance continued, the EU began looking
introspectively at how to strengthen its unity along with preparing for the rebuilding of
many of the post-communist eastern European states. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty
fortified the three pillars of European government furthering the alliance between all
member states. This treaty laid out an agenda for the strengthening of Europe’s role in the
world affairs. Hoping to lessen it’s reliance on the US partnership, the ‘pillar’ of a
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) aimed to bolster the Europe’s diplomatic
say.
With a solidified Europe attempting to “hold it’s own” as a major power in
foreign affairs, separate from US hegemony, the transatlantic alliance has diverged on
some issues. Security threats and foreign policy have clearly evolved from the common
communist threat during the Cold War, to the modern issues both states face of terrorism
and nuclear proliferation. Although the strong US/European partnership of much of the
20th century is yet again confronted with analogous security threats, the question remains,
will the alliance strengthen on its similarities or be undermined by differences of interests
and diplomatic strategies?
International Relations in a Globalizing World:
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The twenty-first century marks a new era in global history. With the end of Cold
War world politics and the increasing spread of technology around the world, many
countries are beginning to experience Western democratization and development. The
integration of economics and technology among nations has entwined the world into a
globalized net of relations. “In the past two decades, capitalism has lost its national
characteristics. It has become global due to the growing power of transnational
corporations with their global market strategies.” 75 Globalization has not only impacted
the way business and economics are conducted but has also incited a new way in which
foreign policy should be conducted.
Just as Multi-National Corporations have become the major players in global
technological and economic interactions, non-governmental and supranational institutions
have experienced an increasing role in political affairs. “Global civil society represented
by transnational social movements and NGOs will force the institutions of the modern
world system/international society to change rapidly… shared sovereignty regimes of
states will become a more salient feature in the future.”76 Many experts agree on the
increasing significance of multinational political cooperation. Globalization has
essentially made the world seem smaller by blurring the borders and differences between
many countries through economic and even political cooperation. Furthermore, it has
been theorized that global governance has become pluralized; rulemaking is “no longer a
matter simply for states or intergovernmental organizations. Private firms, NGOs,
subunits of governments and the transnational and trans-governmental networks that
result, all play a role, typically with central state authorities and intergovernmental
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organizations.” 77 In fact, Magone suggests in his book The New World Architecture that
“we are in the middle of a paradigm shift that no longer sees the nation-state as the only
central actor of international society.” 78 The decreasing strength of the traditional
importance of the nation-state comes to little surprise considering the nature of
transnational politics today.
Political interests and security threats of the 21st century have gone beyond
nation-to-nation diplomacy. David Held suggests that in this new world order “threats to
national security are becoming both more diffuse and no longer simply military in
character.” 79 Furthermore, “transnational problems, including economic, environmental,
terrorist, cultural, criminal, and other threats to national security cannot be resolved by
national means alone. Solutions require regional and even global mechanisms of
cooperation and coordination.” 80 It is clear from the transnational nature of security
threats facing many nations, particularly the EU and US that international security has
become globalized and thus must be dealt with on a global scale. Therefore, in terms of
dealing with such threats as terrorism and WMD proliferation, “even the most powerful
nation in the world is impotent in light of this threat. Unilateral efforts are ineffective or
counterproductive. In order to preserve and increase their power, states must (a)
cooperate, and (b) negotiate international regulations and establish corresponding
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international regulations…not rivalry but cooperation maximizes national interests.”81
The United States’ hegemonic actions, particularly in terms of the war in Iraq, undeniably
goes against this multilateral approach to increasing one’s power in this new world order.
As will be discussed in the later part of this chapter, the US has clearly isolated
themselves from the prospect of compromise and cooperation with other states.
This is particularly evident in the US/EU alliance. The transatlantic gap is
seemingly widening with the US exerting its superpower status on a unilateral level while
the EU remains focused on a multilateral approach.
Emergence of a European Foreign Policy:
Although the EU has come together to form the world’s largest economy, 82
political unification has traditionally been an afterthought intended to seemingly evolve
over time. As previously discussed, the European Union’s recent goal has been to pool
the national government together developing one voice in foreign policy to have a greater
global impact. Putting forth the Constitution of Europe in 2004, Brussels aimed to
establish this more effective CFSP while also solidifying and strengthening the
supranational role of the EU. The European Constitution intended to replace the existing
EU treaties offers “a vision of how the enlarged European Union of 25 or more states can
deal with the challenges of the future.” 83 Although all other Member States signed the
constitution, the French and Dutch referendum put the initiative on hold. 84
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a more dynamic EU. However, in October of 2007, “the leaders of the European Union
took the constitution…changed the odd phrase, muddled the odd concept and presented
the Lisbon ‘reform treaty’ to the world.” 85
The passing of the 2007 Lisbon Treaty all but in name marks the passage of the
2004 constitution, since 90% of the constitution is represented in the treaty. 86 The treaty
attempts to the accommodate enlargement of the union, at it’s now 27 members, by
making “EU institutions more efficient and ‘streamlining’ decision-making.” 87 Some of
the major provisions include majority voting in some policy areas, in place of the current
unanimous voting system, and the creation of a full standing president of the Counsel
along with a foreign-policy chief. 88 The High representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy represents, at least on paper, a major advancement of the
CFSP. The consolidation of roles gives this new political chief, working for national
governments and the Commission, more political power, money, and his own diplomatic
corps. 89 This new foreign minister post, if enforced efficiently, seemingly answers Henry
Kissinger’s age old question: “if a world power needs to talk to Europe, whom do they
call?” 90
Many people regard the Lisbon treaty “as the moment that Europe finally resolved
to live up to its economic heft and become a power on the world stage.” 91 However, the
“constitutional” treaty seems to have come too soon for some. The fact that a chief of
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foreign policy has been instituted during a time when EU leaders still don’t even agree
upon the purpose of the EU, “a political project, or just an exercise in international
economic governance,” 92 suggests that internal disagreements need to be resolved before
constructive political decisions can be made. This ambiguity of the purpose of the EU is
essentially the Achilles heel of Europe’s integration.
This internal friction between those who support a stronger EU, “eurocrats”, and
those who believe in more national sovereignty, “euroskeptics”, is exemplified in the
differing notions of the political implications of the treaty. For example, the Spanish
prime minister, Zapatero sees the treaty as one which “will ’open new horizons’ for the
EU, finally giving the 27 member block the international profile it deserves.” 93 Zapatero
upheld the treaty’s influence stating that it would “permit us to better transmit our values
and affirm our role as defenders of peace on the international scene”, essentially giving
the EU a distinct voice from America. 94 On the other hand, British prime minister
Gordon Brown minimizes its significance describing the “reform treaty” as “a modest
piece of housekeeping, that merely tweaks the way decisions are taken after a dozen new
members have been absorbed in the past few years.” 95 Differing groups within the EU are
clearly interpreting the treaty through their own ideological lenses, choosing to see the
legislation as supporting their intended outcome. It is thus hard to predict the impact of
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the Lisbon treaty, how effective can a foreign policy figurehead be without a common
policy? 96
The advancement of the Europe’s global role is difficult to achieve with such
internal dissent. The British value of sovereignty and its special diplomatic relationship
with the US influences them to consider the EU as more of “a convenience rather than a
concept.” 97 The British, along with other “euroskeptic” member states, favor retaining
national sovereignty thus hoping to limit the EU in becoming a super-state. “Those who
want an EU that is a world power in political and military as well as economic terms,
constantly run up against the problem of trying to build a continental state in an
intellectual and moral climate that is hostile to the predominance of the state.” 98 Many
member-states are not willing to give up their political autonomy and therefore view the
role of the EU as mainly a coalition of nations rather than a ‘continental state’. This adds
to the difficulty of establishing a common EU foreign policy.
In an interview conducted with Luis Balsells-Traver, an official on the
Subcommittee on Security and Defense (SEDE) of the European Parliament, Luis
expressed his optimism in the effectiveness of the treaty. Luis affirmed that ever since the
formation of the CFSP, “member-states have set their own foreign policy agenda and the
EU tools have essentially been put on the back burner.” 99 However, he stated that with
the passage of the “reform treaty” the world will immediately witness the EU working
with “a common agenda, but not yet a complete common foreign policy.” 100 When asked
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how effective this would actually be considering a common foreign policy was not
foreseeable in the immediate future, Luis remained confident that over time it would
strengthen. He credits the Solidarity Clause, which “calls for the Union and its Member
States to act jointly if a Member State is the target of a terrorist attack,” 101 as an integral
part of foreign policy solidification because of its cross-border effects. 102 In terms of
terrorism, Luis suggests that a lot is being done at the EU level to counter terrorism
which receives a large portion of funding. But dealing with Islamic radicalism within the
EU will need to be conducted on a nation-to-nation basis. 103
Luis is confident in Europe’s ability to take on crisis management issues aside
from NATO and states that at this point “the EU is better equipped than NATO.” 104
While he affirms that the transformation of Europe’s defense will bolster their
international role, he recognizes some of the internal setbacks. He states, “Within the EU,
anything seen as taking away from national power, such as the High Representative of
foreign policy, is controversial. Therefore the international agreements of other countries
need to be considered while developing a common foreign policy.” 105 Another interesting
predicament within the EU Luis identifies is the use of the EU as a scapegoat. “A major
internal problem with integration of the EU is its use as a ‘scapegoat’…when something
goes wrong, national leaders are quick to blame the inefficiency of the EU, but take credit
for the positives of the Union.” 106 This is an interesting phenomenon because it likely
creates a sense of distrust of the union among citizens, something that needs to be
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addressed before nations are apt to give up some national sovereignty by converging on a
common foreign policy.
It is suggested that in order to formulate a common foreign policy “ongoing
‘normative integration’ would be necessary, that is, a reference to shared values in a
public realm extending beyond the borders of individual countries…that, in turn…is not
only the precondition but also the effect of a successful European foreign policy.” 107 In
the development of a uniform foreign policy the concept of a European identity needs to
be promoted in order to combine nationalistic views and policies into a common
European stance. Regardless of the debated extent of the impact of the Lisbon treaty, it
can only be a step forward, no matter how big or small, in the cohesion of the union.
Therefore, for the future it is mainly a matter of whether this political unity will continue
to evolve thus determining how effective it’s global role will be.
Withstanding the internal disputes as to the political purpose of the EU, “there has
been a gradual strengthening, over the past 2 decades, of commitment to and capacity for
foreign policy cooperation.” 108 Similarly, a 2003 Transatlantic Trends poll suggests that
2/3 of those polled wanted to see the European Union become a superpower. 109 Along the
same lines, when asked about the future of the EU, the vast majority of citizens proposed
their support for more political intervention and decision-making at the European level on
such issues as terrorism and organized crime. 110 With the citizen’s fundamental support
and the recent passage of the Lisbon treaty, it seems likely that the EU will continue to
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develop its role in international politics, advancing its position as global actor in the
future.
Although many Europeans would like to see the EU become more involved in
international policy, Levy et al. suggests that the essential missing element is agreement
upon a common foreign policy. “Only when Europe succeeds in developing a culture of
world-political thinking will it assume a prominent and relevant role in the shaping of the
world… what Europe needs most urgently is a rational calculation of its cosmopolitan
interests.” 111 Furthermore, in an essay in La Republica , Umberto Eco states “without a
common foreign policy and a military defense plan, Europe will end up counting as much
as ‘Guatemala.’” 112 Eco clearly holds an extreme view of Europe’s world role. However,
it is evident that if the citizens truly seek a more politically influential EU, a common
foreign policy representing the interests of all members must be agreed upon.
European Union Security Threats and Strategies:
An emerging European common foreign policy and global role likely will not
represent what American’s typically consider international policy and military power to
be. In general, Europeans seem to favor more multilateralism and negotiations in
diplomacy. Which interestingly corresponds with what experts outlined as how to
maximize one’s national interests and power in a globalizing world.
While it is evident that Europeans are not very eager to evolve into a super-state
system, many recognize the benefit of a more politically unified EU. One commonality
among European states is the their reluctance to go to war. National politicians realize
that the European public would never agree to taxation for defense spending close to
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anything like that of the US. 113 This is likely because their “threshold of tolerance for the
use of force against persons is relatively low.” 114 Military power is certainly low on
Europe’s agenda. Instead, they emphasize the influence of ‘soft power’ in diplomatic
relations. “For among the many other motives pushing toward integration is the desire of
Europeans to be a major player on the world scene. Some may hold that this can be
achieved wholly through ‘soft power’- that is the power of European example in pointing
toward a world governed by multilateralism and the rule of law.” 115 There is a strong
sense among Europeans that as a world actor, they could counter America’s ‘hard power’
inclinations and advance Europe’s values of multilateral promotion of peace, democracy,
and human rights.
The EU places much of its international political clout in supranational
institutions. For the EU, “the desire for a multilateral and legally regulated international
order is connected with the hope for an effective global domestic policy, within the
framework of a reformed United Nations.” 116 The idea of giving more power to the UN
in a reformed framework represents many European’s desire to exert their global
influence through the cooperation of the UN. Clearly this suggests Europe’s emphasis on
transnational rule of law in guiding foreign policy. Therefore, it is no surprise that, “in
European academic circles, at least, multilateralism in all its forms occupies the moral
high ground, and national interests and outlooks are generally regarded as retrograde.” 117
Most Europeans view foreign relations through a globalized framework, regarding the
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power of the nation-state as ‘retrograde’. This is suggestive of the EU’s desired global
role to counter America’s national interest based view of foreign policy.
Corresponding to this notion of Europe’s focus on the advancement of public
good is the European value of the promotion of peace, democracy, and the preservation
of human rights. Most European member-states have traditionally been active players in
humanitarian aid, and in 2000 the EU collectively listed “poverty reduction as the
principle aim of development policy.” 118 It is clear that Europe’s emerging political role
is global in scope since the EU is by far the world’s largest donor of both development
and humanitarian assistance, providing 70 percent of overseas development assistance to
poor countries, four times more than the US. 119 This value seems based upon Western
Europe’s long history of imperialism in much of the world, which has eventually evolved
into establishing the EU’s “role as a relatively benign ‘patron/mentor’ in relation to the
South.” 120 Since 9/11 the EU has aimed to increase EU coordinated development with
more of a focus on establishing security in developing nations. The 2003 European
Security Strategy emphasized that “security if the first condition for development” and
that the effectiveness of EU humanitarian institutions, such as the European Development
Fund, “can have an impact on our security and on that of third countries.’” 121 Even
though the EU is already a major global actor in development, the full potential of the
EU’s role “could be realized only if greater consistency was achieved between EU and
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Member State policies.” 122 Yet again, increased coordination within the EU, through a
common foreign policy, could yield to greater effectiveness of the EU as a global actor.
Accompanying the EU’s extensive role as a global aid donor, it also focuses much
of its external relations as a regional actor. The mere notion of the European Union as a
desirable “club” in which much of the region aspires to belong to is arguably the EU’s
most effective foreign policy mechanism. The benefits and exclusivity of the union has
supplied Europe with the means to democratize and build up the continent through the
‘golden carrot’ of the prospect of membership. The concept of EU membership as a
foreign policy instrument is apparent in the union’s regional relations. The fall of the
Soviet Union left much of Central and Eastern Europe searching for political order. The
EU was able to use the prospect of membership to advance democracy and improve
relations with the region. The Central and East European Countries (CEEC) transformed
their political and economic institutions to converge with EU interests as set forth in the
Copenhagen Criteria. The Copenhagen Criteria for membership, established in 1993,
requires candidate countries to meet specific guidelines including stable democratic
institutions, functioning market economies, and the ability to integrate the aims of the
EU. 123 The European Union’s ability to transform regional governments to their
standards is an impeccable example of Europe’s “soft power” at work. Soft power is
essentially “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or
payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals and
policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is
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enhanced.” 124 The legitimacy of the EU has enabled it to engage transitional governments
in the region and use soft power as a democratizing tool.
This foreign policy tool has not only proven effective in the democratization of
the 10 post-communist nations admitted in 2004 and Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, but
has also improved relations with Turkey and the Western Balkans. Although Turkey’s
capability as an EU member is widely debated, its formal candidate status has ensured
democratic reform in Turkey. It is evident that in the transition from authoritarian
governance in the south and east of Europe, “the European Union has become the major
agency in reshaping the public administrative structures of these semi-peripheral
regions.” 125 The integration incentive into the booming European Union has proven to be
one of their most effective foreign policy tools in spreading peace, prosperity, and
democracy throughout the region.
Of course there are many nations and regions in which the prospect of
membership is not an option because of mere geographical reasons. In order to exert their
soft power, the EU launched the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) “in an attempt to
provide an overarching framework for EU relations with Southern and Eastern ‘noncandidate’ neighbors.” 126 This policy basically consists of Action Plans in which nations
are given financial assistance as an incentive to the commitment of EU political,
economic, and social values. One significant factor in these agreements is the ‘neighbors’
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promotion of combating terrorism and the proliferation of WMD, essentially using
Europe’s ‘soft power’ to combat these threats from within the countries themselves.
The European Union has certainly utilized their advantageous status of an
exclusive “club” as a foreign policy tool to globally promote their values. However, in a
post 9/11 political context, they do face global threats, which citizens agree, must be
managed on a collective EU level. The Council’s 2003 European Security Strategy
“identifies, and links, four ‘key threats’ to the Union’s security- terrorism, proliferation of
WMD, regional conflicts and state failure. It concludes that the ‘first line of defense will
often be abroad’.” 127 This document identifies a shared concept of security threats, not
only among EU member-states, but also “echoes US thinking on these matters.” 128
Similarly, the Council stated that it would fight all forms of terrorism and that “the fight
against terrorism will, more than ever, be a priority objective of the European Union.” 129
While this statement of European foreign policy does seem congruent with American
governmental sentiment at the time, the two seem to differ in their strategies on the threat
of terrorism.
Whereas the Bush Administration declared the “War on Terror”, Europeans were
more concerned with addressing the roots of terrorism. The EU associates terrorism as
“essentially a question of justice and global distribution of wealth, and therefore not a
problem that can be solved by declaring war on it.” 130 In accordance with this
perspective, the EU identified foreign policy tools/strategies for alleviating the cause of
terrorism through the prism of development. The European Development Fund (EDF),
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European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), along with other third parties are to
become the main forces in combating the cause of terrorism and nuclear proliferation. 131
The EU approach to terrorism differs greatly from the US strategy of preemption,
emphasizing a long-term soft power approach as previously mentioned, combined with a
hard power response utilizing the ESDP instruments. 132 Although a common foreign
policy has not yet been solidified, this stance is certainly evidence of a trend in European
diplomacy. With a focus on soft power, humanitarian and development aid, and a
multilateral approach, it seems that the EU has been exhibiting consistency in
international diplomacy. Taking into consideration the recent political advancements of
the Lisbon Treaty, perhaps a common foreign policy for the EU is not as far off as we
think.
US Security Threats and Strategies:
Examining American foreign policy and the role it plays in global politics, it
seems that US foreign policy instruments act in antithesis to how the European Union
conducts diplomacy. The Bush Administration’s reaction to the 9/11 terrorist attacks have
fueled an environment in which the America’s priority is to pursue its hegemony, even if
that means ‘going it alone’. Kagan states that the United States “remains mired in history,
exercising power in the anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are
unreliable and where true security and the defense and promotion of a liberal order still
depend on the possession and use of military might.” 133 Kagan’s description of American
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international relations does seem valid, at least in terms of the policies of the Bush
Administration.
The motives of the ultra-conservative Washington based think tank, the Project
for a New American Century (PNAC), seemingly mirrors Kagan’s assessment of the
American priority of military power. PNAC sets forth many radical goals for the global
role of the US. For one, they “demand the establishment of a global US empire to bend
the will of all nations” with this, the “US armed forces must establish American
dominance for all to see.” 134 Among the strategies for creating this empire is the
modernization of the military by increasing defense spending by almost a third, from 3
percent of the country’s GDP to 3.8 percent. 135 PNAC also calls for ‘four core’ military
missions in which the US must win multiple and simultaneous major theatre wars in
order to shape the security of ‘critical regions’. 136 All of this seems like just an extremist
viewpoint, after all most America’s “don’t necessarily take to the idea of being some sort
of new Rome.” 137 However, under the Bush Administration, the men who had created
PNAC’s imperial dreams became the men who now run the Pentagon, US Defense
Department, and White House. 138
This ideological project has been developing for years and has finally gotten its
say in politics under Bush’s presidency. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 proved to be the
perfect time to institute PNACs strategy under “Bush’s PR War”. 139 Immediately after
the 9/11 attacks, Bush’s released National Security Strategy was “an ideological match to
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PNAC…in many places, it uses exactly the same language to describe the US’s new
place in the world.” 140 Furthermore, Bush’s proposed defense budget called for “$379
billion…almost exactly 3.8 percent of GDP.” 141 With Iraq listed as “the tactical pivot” 142
of US influence in the Middle East, it’s chilling that PNAC’s plan has been instituted in
American governmental policy without the public realizing or understanding what was
going on.
September 11, 2001 clearly provided the means to institute the Bush
Administration’s agenda of a Pax Americana. This focusing event also signifies
American foreign policy taking a turn toward more hegemony and unilateral action,
differentiating itself from its European allies. In September 2002 “the president unveiled
his new national security strategy…his aspiration to put American military power
‘beyond challenge’ and his endorsement of ‘preemptive actions’ against threats from
terrorist rouge states.” 143 Indeed Bush did put the US ‘beyond challenge’ in terms of
international support for Iraq. As will be further discussed in a later chapter, allied and
UN support for Iraq faltered and rather than the US proceeding further with international
support, the US went ‘beyond challenge’ by taking unilateral action.
It has been suggested that this US promotion of self-interest and hegemony is a
“re-nationalization” of America; essentially an ‘empire-like’ insistence on its own
priories, separating itself from international law. “The re-nationalization of the United
Sates goes hand in hand with the non-adherence to the Kyoto Protocol on climate
protection, the contempt for the International Criminal Court, and the refusal to
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acknowledge the worldwide biological-weapon convention.” 144

Similar to the EU’s

strong emphasis on multilateral action in environmental standards, with the Kyoto
Protocol, the EU is an avid supporter of the ICC. The signing of the ICC statute was
“hailed as ‘a historic victory for human rights and international justice’ because it created
a reliable method for prosecuting war criminals when domestic efforts fail.” 145 Although
the US participated in the creation of the ICC under Clinton, Bush withdrew that
signature and now demands US immunity from prosecution in the ICC. 146 Bush’s fear of
US prosecution and subsequent demand of immunity seems to suggest to the international
community that Americans have something to hide. Furthermore, Bush’s divergence on
the ICC has also unified the EU against the US on this issue. 147 This is a significant
divide between the EU and US since as previously discussed; getting all EU members to
unite on a common stance is typically not an easy task.
The United States international policies since 9/11 seem to be a stark contrast
from the EU’s focus on multilateralism and international law. With the case of the ICC,
Bush is essentially blocking one of Europe’s most valued foreign policy tools. To make
matters worse, “America does not care whether or not Europeans regard its actions as a
breach of international law.” 148 US hegemony in this case is not only belittling
multilateral efforts by the EU, but is also signifying Bush’s apathy in the continuity of the
transatlantic alliance.
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America’s egocentrism in foreign policy and the Bush Administration’s emphasis
on world dominance is completely contradictory not only to Europe’s aims as a global
actor, but also to what experts had suggested for obtaining power in a globalizing world.
In terms of the future, Fukuyama suggests, “the key questions that Americans face as
they proceed forward with this war on terrorism are how deep this fundamental challenge
[anti-western forces] is, which sorts of allies it can recruit, and what we must do to
counter it.” 149 There is clear insistence on multilateralism and alliances in modern global
international relations. However, the Bush Administration has continually undermined
their participation in these groups thus eroding allies’ trust and support. “There is
increasing evidence that the policies and tone of the new unilateralists were directly
responsible for the decline of America’s attractiveness abroad.” 150 The Bush
administration’s “re-nationalization” and advancement of their Pax Americana agenda
has isolated the US and has increased anti-American sentiment abroad. “In the United
States, the realization will finally dawn that even a hegemonic power can get entangled in
growing difficulties when it thinks it is able to act without partners.”151 In a globalizing
world, it seems America’s unilateralism and hegemony in foreign policy can only
detrimental to ourselves as it “seems to draw nothing but hate.” 152
US and EU Security and Threats Examined:
The post-9/11 international environment has marked a complete shift from Cold
War politics. The terrorist attacks have forced Western democratic governments to

149

Fukuyama, Francis. "Has History Started Again?" Policy 18(2002): Page 4.
Nye, Joseph. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. 1st ed. New York: Public Affairs,
2004. Page 64.
151
Levy, Daniel, Max Pensky, and John Torpey. Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe. 1st ed. New York:
Verso, 2005. Page 119.
152
Colombani, Jean-Marie. "We Are All Americans." Le Monde. Paris. 12 Sept 2001.
150

47

address Islamic radicalism and come up with strategies to alleviate the growing tensions
between East and West. Once again the EU and US are facing the same security threats.
The European declaration immediately after the terrorist attacks that “we are all
Americans,” 153 suggested a stronger partnership between the two democracies. But,
seven years later, the gap between two powers’ political perceptions and strategies are
quite evident.
An emerging European foreign policy has altered EU reliance on the United
States. Although both powers identify the same main threats of terrorism and WMD
proliferation, their strategies to counter these threats are remarkably different. As
previously discussed, the EU generally exercises ‘soft power’ whereas the US tends to
focus on ‘hard power’. “Post-heroic Europeans tend to favor procedure, talk, international
institutions and incremental measures to resolve ideas, where Americans tend to favor
resolve backed by force.” 154 This is clear in their security strategy analyses, with the EU
aiming to curb terrorism at its roots and the Bush Administrations focus on fighting it
from the top down with military dominance in the region.
The reason for differences in their diplomatic strategies is certainly ideological in
nature, while also tying into their individual perception of threat. After all, “perceptions
create the overall context in which foreign policy decisions are made…[and] the threat
perceptions and security concepts are different in Germany and the United States.” 155 The
Bush Administration was seemingly always a proponent of US hegemony and the 9/11
terrorist attacks signified an infraction on this power. It could be argued that because the
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Bush Administration conducts world politics in a paradigm of ‘hard power’ and
domination, they therefore perceived World Trade Center Attack as a breach to power
thus aiming to retaliate with extreme force. Europe on the other hand, whose “mission is
to oppose power” 156 and places value on humanitarianism, perceives terrorist activity as
an economically based problem. Furthermore, “what differentiates the US and Europe are
striking oppositions in their perception of danger…For Americans, it is the horror of
terrorism that reveals itself, while for the Europeans it is the horror of war.”157 The two
powers essentially function under paradigms with differing values therefore influencing
them to take different stances on seemingly identical issues.
Perhaps Europe’s vivid memory of a war-dominated continent has influenced
their hesitation toward the use of ‘hard power’. “Peace is much more of an absolute value
today in Europe than in the United States, as are opposition to the death penalty and
commitment to reversing global warming.” 158 Looking at the EU’s external relations,
their global scope of issues is apparent. In general European citizens are more concerned
with the protection of the environment and human rights than Americans are. Similarly,
Europeans contribute more to the development of nations. In 2003, Foreign Policy
magazine ranked wealthy nations by their ‘commitment to development’ “the
Netherlands did the best, closely followed by Denmark and New Zealand. [Whereas]
Japan just beat the United States for bottom place.” 159 It seems remarkable that the US,
already the world’s superpower, can allocate $379 billion a year on military spending but
comes second to last in developmental aid.
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Going hand in hand with the EU/US differing values are their foreign policy
strategies. As discussed, it is clear that Europeans and Americans emphasize different
foreign policy tools of ‘soft power’ and ‘hard power’ however; it is unclear as to which is
more effective. It has been suggested that enlargement and the prospect of membership
has been the EU’s most successful foreign policy tool. Chris Huhne suggests, “The
EU…exercises a soft power on its periphery that has far more transformational impact
than the American neo-con agenda in the Middle East. Countries in the Balkans wanting
to come into the European democratic family have to adapt.” 160 Indeed, the impact of
European ‘soft power’ relations has proven successful in the democratization and
economic development of the Central and Eastern European nations. Similarly, other
countries in the region, such as the Balkans, and nations of the Neighborhood Policy have
also been greatly impacted by the EUs focus on development. While on the other hand,
the US military actions to institute democracy in the Middle East have shown minimal
success.
Although the EU does not yet have a common foreign policy, it seems that their
use of ‘soft power’ has bolstered respect in the international arena, while US militarism
has only lessened their accountability. “Despite the fact that many Eastern European
leaders supported the US-led war [Iraq], their citizens felt that the EU plays a more
positive role than the US on a variety of transnational issues…ranging from fighting
terrorism to reducing poverty.” 161 In addition to their use of ‘soft power’, the EU also
utilizes international institutions for peacekeeping. “Europe has ten times as many troops
as the United States involved in peacekeeping operations under multilateral organizations
160
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such as the UN and NATO.” 162 Their larger proportion of peacekeeping troops in the UN
and NATO may be due to the fact that the EU does not have its own army, while the US
does. However, their extremely large proportion does reflect Europe’s focus on
multilateral peace keeping.

Joseph Nye has suggests that the use of ‘soft power’,

multilateralism, and alliances are key to solving problems in a globalizing world. If this is
true, it seems that the Bush Administration’s approach to ‘world domination’ should be
reconsidered. In fact it has been suggested that the EU should “exert their influence to
pressure, shame, and encourage the United States and its citizens to join in this
project.” 163
This shift of interpretation of US foreign policy is not likely under the Bush
Administration’s PNAC- ‘empire’ oriented global strategy. But perhaps with the 2008 US
presidential election, a more moderate administration will be elected under which the EU
and US can work collectively in this global environment.
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EU/US Intervention in a Pre-9/11 Context: the premature unveiling of
European foreign policy compels Americans to ‘take the reins’
…a third milestone in EU/US relations was the agreement signed by
the United States and the European Union in December 1995 on “A
New Transatlantic Agenda’…to acknowledge the EU’s pivotal role
as the center of the new politico-security architecture emerging in
post-Cold War Europe…These priorities looked set to shape the
European Union and the United States joint security agenda for the
twenty-first century. 164

The increasing political unity of the European Union in the early 1990s evolved
simultaneously with the growing crisis in the Balkans. The foundation for a European
political voice was declared in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty; providing European officials
with the illusion that the union was prepared to lead their first EU-level crisis intervention
mission. The EU, having previously been involved in many humanitarian and
peacekeeping operations under UN and NATO command, decided to showcase their new
foreign policy immediately declaring control over handling the Yugoslav crisis. As
diplomatic relations materialized, the lack of policy cohesion within the EU led to
differing strategies and thus negotiations between the ethnic groups were undermined by
the lack of a united front. In addition, once negotiations were put forth, the lack of
military power to enforce the agreements detracted from EU authority. Relations in
Bosnia-Herzegovina were most detrimental to Europe’s crisis management credibility
and as the fighting ensued, it took US military involvement to mediate the conflict. While
Macedonian diplomatic relations proved to be the most successful, the EU crisis
mitigation effort in the Balkans seems to be unprepared from the beginning due to the
novelty and lack of capacity of EU foreign policy.
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Issue of European Recognition of Croatia:
One of the first post-Cold War conflicts came with the dissolution of communism
in Yugoslavia, breaking up the state into conflicting ethnic entities. The democratic
elections following the collapse of the federal Communist party became the grounds for
the entities’ “right to national self-determination.” 165 Conflict over territorial autonomy
began in June of 1991 when Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence from
Yugoslavia. 166 The European Community (EC) effectively mediated the ten-day war
between the Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA) and Slovenia, 167 however the situation in
Croatia would prove to be a more complicated issue. The newly elected Croatian
government under Tudjman pursued a nationalist agenda thus creating hostilities between
the Croatian government and Serbs in the region, eventually brining about war between
Croatia and the YPA. 168
Soon thereafter, Foreign Minister Jacques Poos made clear the intention of the EC
with its newly developing political role. “If one problem can be solved by the Europeans,
it is the Yugoslav problem. This is a European country and it is not up to the Americans.
It is not up to anyone else.” 169 The war in Croatia had created the largest refugee crisis in
Europe since World War II, forcing the EC to take a stand. 170 The EC urged the UN to
broker a cease-fire between the Serbians and Croatians, and UN peacekeeping troops
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were sent into the region. 171 The concept of recognizing the declared independence of
Slovenia and Croatia was highly debated within the EC. Under immense German
pressure by Chancellor Helmut Kohl, the EC agreed to accept Slovenia and Croatia’s
right to national self-determination. This recognition, as declared in the Brioni
Agreement was originally “hailed as the first success of Europe’s new independent
foreign policy.” 172 However, the Brioni Agreement gave little thought to the political
implications that recognition would have on the other former Yugoslav republic’s, which
also aimed for independence thus pushing Bosnia-Herzegovina closer to war. 173
This initial diplomatic neglect to see the ‘larger picture’ seems to be due to the
Western internal division as to how to approach the conflict. In opposition to the Brioni
Agreements, for example, Britain’s Lord Peter Carrington, chairman of the EC
Conference on Yugoslavia, suggested that withholding recognition could provide the EC
with leverage in order to influence the former republics to negotiate a peaceful solution.
Additionally, he identified that recognition of Croatia and Slovenia would justify BosniaHerzegovina’s right to independence, thereby initiating civil war. 174 Although it is not
certain whether Carrington’s withholding recognition would have ameliorated the
situation, it does seem clear that Croat and Slovene independence heightened the
likelihood of war.
Bosnia-Herzegovina:
The ethnically heterogeneous state of Bosnia-Herzegovina consisted of Serbs,
Croats, and Muslims, whose differences had typically been mediated by the autocratic
171
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communist government. The break up of Yugoslavia along with EC recognition of
Slovene and Croatian independence “opened the door to war by forcing the question of
the self-determination of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its respective nationalities.” 175
Contention among Bosnia-Herzegovina’s ethnic groups quickly led to conflict, which
Western governments failed to prevent.
In an analysis of Western involvement during the emergence of conflict and in the
peace process of the Bosnian War, reveals the internal disputes regarding the debated
extent of effective negotiation along with the use of force. It seems that this lack of
coordination within and among Western powers hindered the resolution of the conflict,
drawing on the war longer than necessary.
Authors Burg and Shoup suggest that, “opportunities to avert war in Bosnia were
overlooked during the earliest stages of Western involvement.” 176 The initial European
response to the Yugoslav crisis revolved around the EC’s proposed principles that
territorial status quo should not be altered, the use of armed force in border conflicts was
unacceptable, and the approval of self-determination as long as it was democratically
based and did not aim to alter borders by violence. 177 When declaring the principle of a
territorial status quo not only did the EC fail to take into consideration the legitimacy of
the communist administrative unit borders but also that regaining territory and redefining borders was one of Serbia and Croatia’s main goals.
It seems that the EU neglected to consider all sides of the argument in how to
avert increasing conflict. For instance, the EC immediately rejected a plan put forth by
the Netherlands advocating the possibility of redrawing territorial borders to acquire a
175
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settlement before the conflict increased even further. 178 The EC disregarded the
Netherlands’ suggestion claiming that the only long-term success would be in a
comprehensive solution. However, it is suggested that the only available comprehensive
solution would have been to divide up Bosnia, which was essentially what was decided
upon in the Dayton Peace Agreement. Similar to the EC’s dismissal of the Netherlands’
proposal, which ended up being the basis of the peace compromise, the suggestion of a
rapid reaction force by the EC was immediately “discarded and buried.” 179 Although
retrospectively it is easier to identify ineffective strategies, it does seem that in the initial
crisis phases, the EC disregarded competent diplomatic proposals that could have altered
the nature of the conflict.
Burg and Shoup imply an inherent failure of Western governments to effectively
take diplomatic action in the initial conflict, which they suggest, could have prevented
war. The EU had come together specifying clear principles of negotiation in the Balkan
region; their next step was to ensure that the situation did not collapse into violence. Lord
Carrington put forth the prospect of a peace conference to discuss the Bosnian
independence referendum. In the 1992 Cutilero negotiations, EC mediator Jose Cutilerio
proposed a “state of national regions” 180 which would essentially divide BosniaHerzegovina into three ethnic cantons, which together would rule an independent
Bosnian. 181 Cutilerio planned to support all three ethnic groups in a Bosnian government;
however this plan only “deepened the gap between the three sides over the future of
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Bosnia. Each side rushed to exploit the situation, or to attack the accords.” 182 Getting all
sides to agree on the issue of how the cantonal borders would be drawn proved to be an
endless task. With the Muslims disfavor of cantons based on the view that they would
essentially be de facto secession, whereas the Serbs and Croats support of the plan simply
for that reason, the Cutilero plan failed to reach a consensus.
During this time in 1992, Bosnian Serbs had rejected independence, which
resulted in a vote for succession from Yugoslavia. 183 Western internal discord over
whether or not to recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina’s independence was high at this time.
The United Sates pushed to recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina in the spring of 1992 arguing,
that Serbia was preparing for an attack against Bosnia and that recognition would be
beneficial stating that it would discourage civil war. 184 However, the United States’
proposal did not take into account the hostility that would arise from Western recognition
of Bosnian independence. Burg and Shoup suggest, “the progressive disintegration of
Bosnia meant that Croatia and Serbia would be forced to intervene at some point, if only
against each other.” 185 It seems that America’s policy of recognizing Bosnian
independence stemmed from their lack of analysis of the regional crisis. This is most
likely due to a reoccurring American trend of governmental lack of interest and
involvement at the onset of a crisis. Opposition in the Pentagon made it difficult for the
US to get involved, however the governmental notion that the Balkan crisis did not pose a
threat to US national interest was primarily what hindered initial US direct
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involvement. 186 Additionally, it has been suggested that the US government was deterred
from getting too involved in the Balkans because of a post-Vietnam syndrome. 187 Thus,
the US was essentially ineffective in mediating the crisis in the beginning due to several
different factors but primarily due to a lack of self-interest.
While the US government should have been more willing to cooperate in the
region, their stance is understandable considering the EC declaration that ‘it is the hour of
Europe,’ and ‘if anybody can achieve things it is the European Community.’” 188
However, the United States had already started to get superficially involved and was
beginning to influence EC policy. The US clearly didn’t have much vested interest in the
Balkan conflict and it seems therefore that their policy decisions were not as calculated
and coordinated as they could have been. US advocation of Bosnian independence had
clear Serbian repercussions. However, the US did not pressure the Serbians to
compromise when they easily could have offered recognition of Yugoslavia thereby
influencing Serbian acquiescence to the peaceful reorganization of Bosnia. 189 It seems
that if the US were genuinely invested in negotiations, they would have fought to pursue
a compromise with Serbia. Researchers have suggested that US policy recognizing
Bosnia’s independence was influenced by the US aim to replicate Germany’s successful
strategy of recognizing Croatia. 190 However, “US policymakers failed to perceive the
basic difference between the wars in Croatia and Bosnia: The former was a
straightforward territorial dispute; the latter was a question of the existence or
186
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nonexistence of the state itself and, in the eyes of some, the survival of its peoples.” 191
The US essentially chose its policy toward Bosnia carelessly based on previous
negotiations between Germany and Croatia. Furthermore, it seems that part of the
rationale for early recognition was in the aim to create an independent state so that Serbia
could then be blamed for violating sovereignty.
The EC response to Bosnia’s request for recognition set forth a number of
conditions by the advice of the Arbitration Badinter Commission in January 1992. 192 The
Badinter Commission criteria essentially focused on Bosnia-Herzegovina’s democratic
capabilities. One of the initial conditions for recognition was to hold a referendum to
prove popular support for independence. 193 However, this advice was not followed and
“just as Germany ignored the Badinter Commission’s advice that Croatia did not meet its
conditions for recognition, so the EC ignored a crucial ruling by the Commission on
Bosnia Herzegovina.” 194 This ruling suggested that the voted referendum would only be
valid if a substantial percentage of all three ethnic populations voted, however the Serbs
refused to vote. 195 Thus, the EC recognized Bosnia Herzegovina’s independence despite
the fact that the Serbs were not represented in the referendum.
In the initial phases of crisis, Europe was leading the negotiations. This seems to
have been good for the furthering of the political goals of the EC however, it has been
suggested that a strong US presence in initial negotiations would have brought about
more cooperation in the Balkans. “The problem was that the United States, which held
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the key to resolution of the Bosnian conflict, was not present at the EC negotiations.” 196
Whether or not increased US influence would have led to more effective negotiations is
debatable. But a more involved and informed US, by attending the EC negotiations, could
have bolstered Western cooperation in the initial period of crisis, thereby possibly
avoiding the conflict to come.
US involvement in essence began with their proposal to recognize Bosnian
independence. The EC at this point was in the process of negotiations of a peaceful
Bosnian settlement among the Bosnian government, Serbs, and Croats. Regardless of
whether these negotiations would have been successful, they were rendered ineffective
with the US proposal of strategy contradictory to this EC agreement. The EC internal
discord regarding a strategy to ameliorate the conflict is apparent on this issue. While
much of the EC was in favor of continued negotiations on a Bosnian settlement that
would turn Bosnia-Herzegovina into tri-ethnic cantonal state, another portion joined the
US proposal of recognition of Bosnian independence. Consequently, the Cutilerio
negotiations collapsed once part of the EC joined with the US, jointly recognizing Bosnia
in April. 197 Negotiations clearly could not be successful with an uncoordinated EC that is
saying and doing two different things. Cutileiro’s natural disappointment of the EC’s
failure to unify on a position is apparent. He states, “A chance for a peaceful solution had
been allowed to slip away” due to the advice from “well-meaning outsiders who thought
they knew better.” 198
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Cutilerio’s statement reflects his view that the EC was close to negotiating a
successful agreement to mitigate the conflict. The EC had been facilitating negotiations
with the three ethnic parties for quite some time and therefore was relatively more
acquainted and informed of the Balkan issues. Cutilerio implies that US did not fully
understand the effects of recognizing Bosnia and thus undermined EC negotiations.
While Cutilero’s distress over the deterioration of the negotiations due to US policy is
warranted, the failure also occurred on an intra-European level. EC member states clearly
were not unified on a common approach to handling the crisis, therefore many European
nations jumped on the US-bandwagon simply because of the lack of a comprehensive EC
stance. Accordingly, the breakdown of the Cutilerio negotiations seemed to result from
both the internal dissent within the EC along with the external influence of US
recognition policy. One factor is clear, if the EC had a thoroughly developed common
stance and policy in handling the Bosnian crisis, the US suggested recognition would not
have held as much clout and thus the negotiations might have proved more fruitful.
Although US involvement was limited, their impact on Bosnian recognition is
evident. Initially all three sides, the Bosnian government, Serbs, and Croats supported the
Lisbon Agreement but the Bosnian leader, Izetbegovic pulled out at the last minute. It has
been suggested that Izetbegovic’s reconsideration of the plan was the result of US
encouragement to hold out for a better deal. 199 Contrary to Cutileiro’s statement that the
US ‘thought they knew better’, it seems that both the US and EC had been forewarned of
the consequences of their policy. “US and EC diplomats received numerous warnings
from both official and unofficial sources in Serbia that recognition of Bosnia-

199

Woodward, Susan. Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War. 1st ed. Washington,
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995. Page 243.

61

Herzegovina would result in war.” 200 It seems that US involvement not only hindered the
success of the Lisbon Agreement but also divided EC policy, resulting in the highly
discouraged policy recognizing Bosnia-Herzegovina’s independence indicating, “war was
inevitable.” 201
Although this EC/US decision has been highly criticized, it has also been
suggested that the diplomatic misstep came earlier. “The mistake of the West was not in
recognizing Bosnia-Herzegovina on April 7, 1992. The mistake came earlier, and
consisted of its unqualified support for the holding of a referendum on independence
before the three nationalist parties had agreed on a constitutional solution.” 202 Regardless
of when EC diplomacy failed to arrange a peaceful solution, it seems that in all cases
inconsistency and lack of unification among Western governments led to ineffective
policies.
EC and US recognition did indeed accelerate the road to war. Immediately after
recognition, in April 1992, Milosevic, the leader to Serbia invaded eastern Bosnian
Muslim cities along with the Croats attacking Herzegovina shortly after. 203 One would
think that with the onset of fighting in the Balkans the Western community would realize
the severity of the situation and strive for a unified approach to end the conflict. With the
EC still leading the peace effort their coordination of strategy was essential to obtaining a
favorable outcome. However, differences within the EC on the actual foreign policy
agenda and even more so on the implementation of its objectives are still evident. For
instance, the French argued for European intervention through the Western European
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Union (WEU). The British, however, reflected their pro-American posture and advocated
involvement through NATO, which would thus limit EC-level control of the crisis. 204
The discrepancy in foreign policy within the EC itself made it difficult not only for them
to react to the crisis effectively, but also hindered the entire Western response.
“International efforts to end the conflict were further hampered by the lack of
coordination among international actors, and the ongoing unwillingness or inability of
local leaders to fulfill their commitments.” 205 It is clearly difficult for Western collective
coordination to evolve when the principle actor itself is not unified.
This lack of collaboration among Western governments and institutions is also
evident in trying to allocate troops to defend the region. At the onset of war Cyrus Vance,
appointed the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General to deal with the Yugoslav crisis,
argued for a strong UN role to handle the conflict. Likewise, Boutros-Ghali turned down
an agreement to send UN troops handing responsibility back to the EC to find a solution
to the crisis. 206 But because the EC does not have its own military force, they are
essentially required to fall back on the military backing of NATO, the UN, or even the
US. Yet, “the use of force was highly circumscribed, out of concern on the part of
policymakers not to be drawn into commitments from which they would not be able to
disentangle themselves.” 207 The reluctance of individual Western governments and
institutions to bear the costs of war presents a dilemma of what foreign policy tools and
institutions to use to ease the conflict. With no western government perceiving a specific
incentive for involvement, both the EC and US initially held back waiting for the other to
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step up and take responsibility; only to waste valuable time in dissipating the conflict. 208
In addition to the EC and US desire to “free ride” 209 on someone else’s leadership, the
UN and NATO were also waiting for guidance.
Congruent with Western reluctance to become too militarily involved in the
Balkans, Burg and Shoup suggest that another Western diplomatic deficit was that their
responses were essentially ‘crisis driven’. According to this view, responses to the
fighting in Bosnia “were shaped by the need to ‘do something’ rather than by carefully
calculated policy objectives.” 210 This would explain the inconsistency of action and
policies by the West. And is also suggestive of the previously discussed lack of US
interest, which resulted in ineffective, poorly thought out policies. It seems that if
Western institutions had been more proactive and consistent in their policy perhaps they
could have been able to prevent or even stop the war soon after it started.
By July 1992 it became clear that the EC led negotiations “ceased to function as a
means of achieving a political settlement and an end to the fighting,” 211 therefore more
influential and multilateral strategies were necessary. With the Western powers still
unwilling to use force, more intensive negotiations were pursued. In August, the EC and
UN came together creating the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia
(ICFY) as the means to negotiate between the Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians. Despite this
attempt of reconciliation, the London meetings proved ineffective as fighting in Bosnia
sharply increased. Furthermore, although these meetings suggested EC/UN cooperation,
208
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they only deepened the rift between UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali and European
member states involved. 212 This rift was evidently over the previously mentioned
European call to extend UN troops in the region, which against Boutros-Ghali’s position,
were dispatched. 213
The ICFY negotiators led by former US secretary of state Cyrus Vance and
former British foreign secretary Lord David Owen, attempted to balance the recognition
of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the post-Yugoslav states with the individual
rights and constitutional guarantees of the minorities. 214 The Vance-Owen plan involved
dividing Bosnia into ten semi-autonomous territories; however disputes between the
ethnic groups ensued regarding the logistics of the plan. 215 The Vance-Owen plan was
making seemingly little progress with each group unwilling to cede their objectives. Even
before the Serbs rejected the plan in April 1993, 216 it has been suggested that from the
beginning it “never received the support necessary to make it a realistic bases for
settlement.” 217 With the dissolution of the Vance-Owen plan, the EC pursued a strategy
of conceding to Serb and Croat demands for partition. 218
By this point in the conflict, a discrepancy between Western public concern for
the stability of the region and the lack of effective governmental action was apparent. In
both Europe and the United States, there was “relatively strong citizen preferences,
particularly for multilateral action, with relatively weak governmental policies even about
212
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employing allied forces.” 219 In addition, Western public support for intervention
continued to grow as Serbian aggression increased, putting pressure on EC and US
leaders to take more assertive action. 220 Accordingly, United States officials called for a
stronger policy of “lift and strike” through NATO, which consisted of arming and
training the Bosnians while utilizing air power to protect them. 221 The US proposal to lift
the arms embargo against the Bosnian government was strongly opposed by many
Europeans. The EC “appeared willing to accept the status quo rather than become more
deeply involved militarily.” 222 Instead, Europe proposed to establish and defend ‘safe
areas’, which Secretary of State Warren Christopher argued would not only facilitate
ethnic cleansing, but also increase the number of ground troops needed. 223 With the
British and French veto of this US policy, 224 the US reluctantly accepted the
establishment of safe areas because even though they were not perceived as a feasible end
to the conflict, the plan was consistent with Clinton’s strategy of containment. 225
The breakdown of the Vance-Owen plan, in part because of the US “lift and
strike” proposal, created a large rift between the US and Europe. Lord David Owen
criticized the US for “its failure to back his negotiating efforts.” 226 Owen also suggests,
“at the heart of the dilemma facing the Europeans and Americans was the disjunction
between those attempting to negotiate a settlement- the ICFY- and those with the power
219
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to implement it- the United States and NATO.” 227 This illustrates the coordination
disparity between the US and EC and also the inherent inability of the EC to singlehandedly mediate the crisis. The EC negotiation based approach to stabilizing the region
lacked of power to implement the regulations thereby discrediting their authority in the
region. On the other hand, the US and NATO power represented the means to enforce
agreements, but until this point mainly stood on the side-lines of intervention.
A unifying Western mission seems to be emerging at this point with a more
military based involvement by the US, UN, and NATO. The U.N. Security Council took
action extending sanctions several times and establishing a ‘no–fly’ area and ‘security
zones’ in Bosnia–Herzegovina. 228 Similarly, the US and NATO provided “a kind of
sword protecting the shield (UNPROFOR) from Serbian attacks.” 229 However, there still
seems to have been an inherent divide between foreign policy objectives, with the EC
pursuing negotiation and hoping for US ground forces to help police of the area.
Whereas, the US still believed that the war was “not central to our vital interests”230 and
therefore continued to refuse to supply ground troops to Bosnia. Although Europeans
provided the majority of UN forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the EC failed to lead the
ambiguous Western effort and thus “did not play a major part” in the stability of the
region. 231
In analyzing the Western military effort in Bosnia-Herzegovina during 1992 and
1993, it is clear that the EC was still unwilling to use force in the region. Although the
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EC supplied the majority of UN troops, they remained insistent upon international ground
forces as purely a humanitarian effort. It has been suggested that this “pursuit of
diplomacy and of humanitarian intervention became obstacles to military coercion.” 232
This problem is consistent with Lord David Owen’s suggestion that the lack of
international will for military involvement reduces one’s diplomatic clout. 233 Thus, with
no real Western military threat, the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina ensued.
EU Diplomatic Failure Leads to US Leadership Role
The February 1994 Sarajevo marketplace massacre, when Serbian forces opened
fire on civilians, marked a turning point leading to the NATO ultimatum to the Serbs to
pull out their heavy weapons from Sarajevo. The Serbs complied but also responded to
NATO forces by taking 200 peacekeepers as hostages. 234 It “quickly became apparent
that Europe had neither the will nor the means to act.” 235 With the threat of the
withdrawal of UN troops and “the prospect of a complete collapse of the international
effort to end the war,” 236 the US began to see military involvement in the area as
inevitable. President Clinton stated that in order to save the UN peacekeeping forces, the
US should strengthen NATO forces 237 and therefore finally agreed to send 25,000 troops
as part of a NATO mission. 238 Furthermore, Clinton’s advisors encouraged the
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broadening of air strikes. 239 This signifies increased involvement and a hardening of the
US position, strengthening the Western military initiative.
The United States gradually took on the role of hegemonic actor in BosniaHerzegovina as the EC was “criticized for its inability to act ‘in the manner of a
conventional superpower’.” 240 The US began to devise a strategy for peace in the region
through utilizing negotiations of political concessions while integrating military force.
The United States violated the arms embargo in order to arm the Croats and Muslims,
thus changing the face of the war. The US turn toward coercive diplomacy in 1995 was
facilitated by the development of a Muslim-Croat alliance aimed to counterbalance
Serbian power. 241 The threat of Bosnian Serb defeat by the Croat-Muslim alliance
combined with the American offer to lift sanctions was essentially what convinced
Milosevic to finally abstain from violence against the Bosnian Serbs. 242 A cease-fire plan
was finally agreed upon in early October with the last Serb-held territory of eastern
Slavonija reintegrated into Croatia. 243
With a cease-fire in place, the three parties came together in Dayton, Ohio to
begin peace settlements. The Dayton negotiations were a long and arduous process,
which in the end, actually created an agreement closely resembling the European and
contact group proposals for de facto partition in the initial phases of conflict. 244 The
willingness of the US to exert more pressure than ever to get the three parties to agree
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was an essential factor for compromise. Concessions were finally agreed upon to “create
stability, restore human rights and build enduring peace in the devastated state.” 245
The Dayton constitution defined Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state composed of two
entities, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (the Bosnian [Muslim-Croat] Federation)
and the Republika Srpska (the [Bosnian] Serb Republic). 246 The security of the country
was essentially split among four Western organizations. “The Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) would manage elections, the United Nations would
handle aid, and the EU would offer funds for reconstruction, and NATO would send
50,000 troops to keep the peace.” 247 Essentially the US, UK, and France would command
a zone in Bosnia under NATO for one year as the Implementation Force
(IFOR)/Stabilization Force (SFOR). The public impression after the seemingly successful
Dayton Agreements was a realization that “after three years of European
ineffectiveness…it took only two months of the American plan to end the war.” 248
The sense of failure by the European Community at the end of the war was
unmistakable. “The EU found itself in the embarrassing position of initially telling the
US to keep out of Europe’s ‘back yard’, and then relying on the US to force the sides in
the conflict to sit down…to negotiate a peace agreement.” 249 The failure on behalf of the
EC was essentially due to internal dichotomy in terms of political and military action. It
has been suggested that during this conflict, one major downfall of the CFSP was that it
could be used to prohibit the use of force by a member state if this was against a common
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EU policy, but could not be utilized to coordinate EU military strategy and action. 250 It
was therefore extremely difficult for the EC to agree on a common strategy, which made
negotiations essentially ineffective. In addition to the lack of a common strategy as the
leader of the Western initiative, the EC also lacked the military clout necessary to put
pressure on negotiations. “The diverging role of the European Union and United States in
the Balkans through mid-1995 showed Europeans the risks of conducting diplomacy
without the military power to back it up.” 251 Throughout the crisis the US was perceived
as an intrinsic factor to compliance in ending the war because they had military power to
back up threats.
Although European foreign policy instruments were ineffective in mediating the
Bosnian crisis, they did seem to learn from their failure. “By the time of the second
Balkan war in Kosovo in 1999, the EU had altered its role to that of senior partner in the
civilian aspects of the military effort.” 252 Additionally, the Bosnian War took place right
at the conception of Europe’s role as a political power in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty.
Since then Europe has passed legislation strengthening their foreign policy tools
suggesting that now, they might be more equipped to handle international crisis more
effectively.
While the EC was leading the Western response to the Balkan crisis, failure to
stop the fighting was not necessarily all their fault. There was a general “lack of
understanding of the pursuit of national self-determination and its implications for
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international intervention” 253 among the Western institutions. The inherent question of
whether Bosnia was an internal civil conflict or an external war, led to differences in
political strategies of handling the crisis. The disagreements and inconsistency among
western institutions also extended the timetable for feasible solutions to ending the war.

Main Western Governmental Faults in
Mediating the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina
European Union
Overall lack of Common Foreign
Policy hindered leadership
capabilities and the use of force.
Failed to recognize that recognition
of Slovenia and Croatia would
facilitate war in Bosnia and thus the
EU's inability to mitigate the crisis
and take effective diplomatic action
early on.
Unqualified support for holding a
referendum on independence before
the three parties had decided on a
constitutional solution
Failure to communicate a clear and
consistent message to the ethnic
parties
Crisis-driven response to the fighting
rather than pursuing strategic policy
objectives.
Internal disagreements on policy
along with some member states
'bandwagoning' with US policy (As
seen in the Cutliero Negotiations)
Unwillingness to get involved
militarily and the lack of military
clout to enforce negotiation
agreements

United States
Lack of interest based on the view
that the Balkans did not threaten US
national interests limited the
success of preventing the crisis
US policy advocating the recognition
of Bosnia was not strategically
planned and based on superficial
notions (Germany's policy in
Croatia). This consequently
undermined the Cutliero
negotiations.
US 'Lift and Strike' proposal led to
the downfall of the Vance-Owen
plan
Would not get militarily involved in
Bosnia until late in the crisis
Crisis-driven response to the
fighting rather than pursuing
strategic policy objectives.
Dayton Agreement brought the
fighting to a halt but failed to solve
the ethnic issues of the nation.
Put too much pressure on new
governments to turn over war
criminals to the UN tribunal.

Figure 1 refers to the main faults of Western governmental crisis intervention in
Bosnia. Perhaps the only consistent trend of the Western initiative was that, until the end,
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it continued to be ‘crisis driven’. Even during the peace agreements, “rather than having
planned in advance the precise sequence of events that led to Dayton, the Americans
appear to have reacted to developments as they unfolded.” 254 As previously noted, this
was driven by a lack of US interest in the region until it was clear that US military
involvement was inevitable. Even after involvement, the US effort continued to be ‘crisis
driven’ with the US aiming to simply stop the fighting as quickly as possible. The Dayton
Agreement “reflects the interest of the US administration in bringing the fighting to a
halt, rather than the readiness of the three warring parties to settle their political
differences.” 255 Therefore, on the surface it produced peace in the region however, by not
addressing the parties’ inherent differences, underlying instability remains.
This is clear by the fact that in 1996, a year after the signing of the agreement, “an
estimated 100,000 Bosnians have moved, with minorities from each of Bosnian’s three
regions fleeing to areas where their ethnic groups are a majority.” 256 Furthermore, in the
1996 elections for the rotating three-man presidency, the ethnic factions each voted for
their own community representatives by margins reaching 90% based on their own
nationalities. 257 It is clear that although the Dayton Agreements curbed the conflict
between the ethnic groups, Bosnia still remains ethnically divided.
Not only did the Western peace agreement fail to ease ethnic divides, but they
also seem to have put too much pressure on the new governments in turning over war
criminals to the United Nations war crimes tribunal. In some cases, such as Serbian
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nationalist Vojislav Seselj, surrender to the UN court was voluntary. 258 However, in most
cases the West put extreme pressure on Balkan governments to comply and turn over war
criminals to the tribunal. In a case that looks remarkably similar to the US regime change
in Iraq, the US poured $70 million to organize an uprising to remove Serbian president
Slobodan Milosevic from power. 259 The Western-friendly Zoran Djindjic took over as
prime minister, suggesting a promising democratic future for Serbia. However, Djindjic
was assassinated in 2003 likely due to, “the intense pressure by Western governments to
arrest war crimes suspects, particularly Gen. Ratko Mladic” which “had forced him to
confront holdovers from the Milosevic era.” 260 Djindjic’s assassination due to intense US
pressures to hand over Milosevic era war criminals marks a major set back for the US
relationship and the prospects for Serbia. The US should have recognized the danger they
put Djindjic in and perhaps found some middle ground in the pressure put on him to turn
in war criminals.
The inability of the EC to take on the necessary leadership role along with the
lack of US interest in the region enabled the conflict to go on longer than necessary. Once
the Western institutions were able to unite on a common strategy under US leadership,
peace did ensue. However, failing to address the underlying ethnic dissent in Bosnia
suggests that there are also faults in the Dayton Agreement.
Macedonia:
Crisis in Macedonia evolved just as conflict developed in Croatia and BosniaHerzegovina, with the dissolution of Yugoslavia and individual pursuance of
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independence. However, Macedonia represents a unique example of the Balkan crisis in
that, serious conflict was averted through increased EC and US involvement.
Following the example of Slovenia and Croatia, Macedonia declared its
sovereignty from Yugoslavia in September 1991. As seen in the Bosnian crisis, EC
support for the independence of Slovenia and Croatia paved the way for the right to
Macedonian independence. 261 The newly elected Macedonian president Kiro Gligorov
held a referendum in which 71 percent of the electorate supported independence
however, the political parties representing ethnic Albanians and Serbs declared a
boycott. 262 In January 1992 the Badinter commission justified the recognition of both
Slovenia and Macedonia. 263 Despite the Badinter commission’s authorization of an
independent Macedonia, the EC and US refused to recognize Macedonian independence
due to the internal discord among the ethnic entities.264 The increasing conflict in BosniaHerzegovina had a large effect on the instability of Macedonia. 265 As the threat of
conflict was increasing for Macedonia, Gligorov turned to the international community
for assistance.
Historically, Macedonians have an insecure sense of national identity. The
territory and culture of Macedonia has been claimed by many of its neighbors such
Bulgaria, the Serbs, and even the Greeks claim authority to the name ‘Macedonia’. 266
However, many Macedonians have developed on a strong sense of nationalist identity
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through their government, thus threatening the minority groups within the country. The
Albanian community in Macedonia makes up 23% of the population. 267 Most live in a
concentrated area in western Macedonia along with areas in Kosovo. Macedonian
Albanians, fueled by Albanians in Kosovo, mobilized for political action in the
democratization movement throughout the 1990s. The Macedonian nationalist
government aimed to maintain stability by offering the Albanians some political
representation in the hopes that this would deter them from demanding national rights. 268
However, Albanians were “rapidly radicalizing in their demands for group—based
political rights to territorial autonomy for Ilirida, as they called their proto-state in the
western countries.” 269 As exemplified in the other Balkan crises, the EC and US was
initially reluctant to get involved in the Macedonian conflict. However, the west did
intervene, proposing special status for Albanians at The Hague Conference in October
1991. 270
The West seemed to be making the same mistake as it had been in other areas of
the Balkans of “talking to warring parties as if this were a civil war rather than a struggle
by each for national rights.” 271 As a result of this discrepancy, the west was focusing on
the human rights of the Albanians, which was facilitating the link of Albanians in
Macedonia with those in Kosovo. 272 This essentially created a dual role for the West,
“unqualified support for Macedonia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity was coupled
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with demands to improve the lot of Albanians.” 273 The international community was
labeling the Albanian paramilitary groups as ‘terrorists’ while supporting the sovereignty
of Macedonia. 274
The EC was in a unique, but yet again, divided position at this time, as they were
arguing for the recognition of Macedonia with Greece urging against it. 275 The Greek
government refused to recognize the sovereignty of Macedonia because they claimed sole
legal right to the title ‘Macedonia’; the name of the Northern Greek province bordering
Macedonia. 276 The European reluctance to punish this Greek stance on behalf of
Macedonia “bred alienation among average citizens…against the international
community.” 277 Although this feeling of neglect was felt, the international community
made up for it by bolstering a proactive policy. In November of 1992, with fighting on
its borders, the Macedonian government requested UN assessment of the stability of the
area. The following month UN authorized UNPROFOR to “monitor conditions and to
report any threatening movements” along the Macedonian border with Serbia and
Albania. 278 Additionally, the signing of the Association and Stabilization Agreement
gave Macedonia preferential trade relations with the US and EC. 279 The west was
successful in hampering this potential crisis by condemning the violence on the National
Liberation Army (NLA) and “applied enough pressure and incentives to convince
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Albanian and Macedonian elites that their best interests would be found in a negotiated
settlement.” 280
The political situation in Macedonia has been teetering on the verge of conflict
since the dissolution of the Yugoslav state. Although Macedonia has proven to be one of
the most stable Balkan countries throughout the 1990s, the spillover effects of violence
from the 1999 Kosovo war had dangerous effects. The 2001 crisis in the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), instigated by the proliferation of Albanian
paramilitaries from Kosovo, was a direct result of NATO’s failure to disarm and disband
the Kosovo Liberation Army. 281 The ethnic divisions and political instability of
Macedonia implied that conflict could encapsulate its “porous borders” 282 at any
moment. It seems that in the wake of the failure to prevent conflict in BosniaHerzegovina, the EU revamped its crisis intervention willingness and capability. The EU,
along with the US and NATO effectively put pressure on the insurgent’s target, by
reforming the Macedonian government, while emphasizing negotiation and applying
“enough pressure and incentives to convince Albanian and Macedonian elites that their
best interest would be found in a negotiated settlement.” 283 As Robert Hislope has
suggested, the EU crisis prevention in Macedonian differs from that of the other Balkan
crises, in that Macedonia was too militarily weak to resist negotiation initiatives. 284
Therefore, although international intervention was successful in FYROM, exaltation of
the EU’s foreign policy capabilities should be taken one step at a time.
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Effectiveness of the EU’s Emerging Foreign Policy
The 1992 Maastricht Treaty set forth the creation of a political dimension to the
European Union. Coinciding with EU foreign policy evolution, the dissolution of
communist Yugoslavia provided the EU with essentially their first crisis-handling
situation. The EU immediately claimed responsibility for managing the stability of the
region however, as one diplomatic crisis led to another, war ensued. With war raging in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the EU’s inability to unify to cohesively solve the crisis became
apparent. The US government, finally convinced of the importance of stability in the
Balkan region, became involved. The United States military involvement through NATO
was effective providing the necessary authority and incentives for diplomatic agreements,
and eventually the Dayton Agreement established peace in the region. Furthermore,
NATO’s involvement fortified the institution’s relevance and viability in the post- Cold
War era. “It was going to be a new alliance, based on newly defined conditionality and
honed for out-of-area operations…proof that the old institutions need not disintegrate or
fade away.” 285 Cooperation within the transatlantic alliance seemed to be increasing with
the end of the Bosnian war (yet mainly under US control) and fully came together in
preventing conflict in Macedonia through negotiation. Although the Balkan region has
had spurts of instability since this time, major crisis has generally been averted. Ensuring
the future stability of the Balkan region, however, will depend on the effectiveness of EU
foreign policy.
The failure of EU management of the escalating conflict revealed the inadequacy
of the CFSP at that time and thus confirmed the EU’s role in foreign policy as
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subordinate to that of the US and UN. 286 However, the EU has seemingly learned from
their diplomatic mistakes in the Balkans and has now become the principle external actor
in the region. 287 The realization of the inadequacy of the EU in mitigating the Bosnian
conflict and subsequent reliance on US involvement has opened Europe’s eyes to its need
to alter its civil capabilities with military instruments and has thus only increased the
development of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). 288 Moreover, in
recognition of its lack of military clout in Bosnian negotiations the EU aimed to bolster
its influence by developing a European Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). In 1999, Europe
fortified its role in foreign policy and influence in the Balkan region launching its firstever military operation, taking over NATO forces in Macedonia and also replacing
NATO as the lead for the police mission in Bosnia. 289
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US/EU Intervention in a Post- 9/11 Context: Bush’s imperial hubris
squanders international support and American credibility
…the underlying worry on the European side of the Atlantic is that the
United States is trying to play God in the volatile Middle East at enormous
risk to everyone. 290

…Europe sees the United States today more through the prism of Baghdad
than Berlin. 291

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon
sparked a transformation of global foreign relations marking a clear change from Cold
War and post-communist politics. The US and EU, again faced with a common threat,
showed a unified multilateral response to the terrorist attacks. European leaders
immediately guaranteed their “unlimited solidarity” with the United States, and within
hours NATO implemented the Article V mutual defense clause. 292 Bush, who was largely
disliked in Europe before 9/11, gained allied support due to a perception of his
carefulness and the appropriateness of action against Afghanistan. This resulted in
Europeans “strongly supporting military action not only against the Al Qaeda network
but also against its Taliban hosts.” 293 Furthermore, Bush even won the unusual French
support as illustrated by their statement “we are all Americans.” 294 The transatlantic
alliance seemed to be synthesizing out of the tragedy of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
However, this unified opposition to terrorism soon began to collapse based on policy
differences.
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It seems that post- 9/11 relations in the Middle East have “served as the most
significant backdrop against which the EU-US differences were played out.” 295 Their
conflicting policy preferences became apparent throughout the Afghanistan and Iraq
engagements and seemingly stems in part from differing perceptions of the threat of
terrorism. The United States essentially interpreted 9/11 as an attack on ‘Western
Values’, whereas Europeans saw it as an attack on US policies towards the Middle East
and much less of a direct threat to the EU. 296 As examined in the second chapter,
perceptions create the context for foreign policy decision-making. 297 Therefore, the
opposing perspectives on the threat of terrorism influenced both sides of the Atlantic to
act through differing prisms of foreign policy. Furthermore, the European notion that the
attacks were motivated in opposition to US policy would make them more likely to
pursue a differing more ‘soft power’ approach to deterring terrorism in the region.
In essence, although the US and EU both still recognized a common security
threat, “the Al Qaeda terrorist attacks have not re-created the same level of unity that the
Soviets did.” 298 The differences in policy throughout the Afghan and Iraq wars clearly
illustrate the paradigm differences between the US and EU. The United Sates’ inability to
effectively fight terrorism and promote democracy in Afghanistan, and to an even greater
extent, in Iraq, have demonstrated that solely ‘hard power’ tactics alone are not effective
in 21st century globalizing politics. It seems that the US is trying to fight terrorism
through a Cold War era mentality of ‘hard power’, which has only fueled terrorist
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mentality and activity in these nations.

299

Although as of now there is no definitive

strategy to combat terrorism, it seems that the EU approach to eliminating it at its roots
through ‘soft power’ has had greater success than the Bush administration approach,
which has thus far only been counterproductive.
An examination of the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks illustrates
the Bush administration’s promotion of ‘hard power’ militant tactics through the
declaration of War on Terrorism. As the war evolved from fighting terrorism in
Afghanistan, to invading Iraq for the sole purpose of regime change, the legitimacy of the
war crumbles. This not only stems from the fact that the US-led efforts are unable to
effectively combat terrorism and ensure reconstruction and stability for the regional
populations, but is also based on Bush’s increasing contempt for multilateralism.
Throughout the war effort many EU nations recognized the Bush administration’s
unilateralist approach and this notion was fortified with the continued build up of the Iraq
war. Additionally, US policies and subsequent failure in Iraq exacerbated what little
European support the US did enjoy. Thus further discrediting American ‘hard power’
policies and overall capabilities, while undermining the initial strong EU support for the
US and the transatlantic alliance as a whole.
Bush Administration’s Post- 9/11 Emphasis on Militarism
Although Bush’s first year of presidency assumed little of the unilateral militarist
foreign policy that would be revealed in the wake of September 11th, it has been
suggested that the Bush administration always had its eye on Iraq. As Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice stated in 2000, “the United Sates must mobilize whatever resources it
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can…to remove him [Saddam Hussein].” 300 The Al Qaeda terrorist attacks quickly
centered US attention on the Middle East and essentially provided a ‘window of
opportunity’ for Bush’s more aggressive foreign policy and regime change- agenda in
Iraq.
President Bush identified the attacks as “an act of war against our country” 301 thus
declaring US engagement in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). 302 The ‘Bush
Doctrine’ of foreign policy themes, outlined mainly in the September 2002 National
Security Strategy (NSS), affirms four key elements of “preventative war, confronting the
nexus of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and catastrophic terrorism, ‘regime
change’ for ‘rouge states’, and democracy promotion.” 303 The Bush administration aimed
to exert US domination on terrorists and their accomplices calling “for yet another
expansion of the empire of liberty…it must pre-empt such threats wherever they appear;
it will extend democracy everywhere.” 304 This post 9/11 foreign policy represents a shift
toward fundamentally aggressive unilateralism based on the United States’ hubris as a
superpower.
The hegemonic principles of the Bush Doctrine emerging throughout this time
reflect the ideals of the Project for the New American Century (PNAC). As discussed in
chapter two, this neoconservative think-tank aims to give birth to a Romanesque global
American empire by “fighting and decisively winning multiple, simultaneous major
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theater wars” 305 and occupying those areas to exert US dominance in a post-war context.
PNAC members recognized one of their main obstacles was in finding the political
support to implement such imperious foreign policy and stated the need for “some
catastrophic and catalyzing event- like a new Pearl Harbor.” 306 The terrorist attacks
essentially fulfilled this role and served as the basis for the Bush administration’s
implementation of a more militaristic foreign policy.
Consistent with Bush’s pursuance of a more bellicose foreign policy was his
declaration of the War on Terror. One of the first objectives of this newly declared war
was to wipe out the Al Qaeda terrorist network and with that the Taliban government
who assisted them. As previously mentioned, much of Europe was in political solidarity
with the US, eager to take action against the terrorist threat. The partnership appeared to
be strengthening as Bush stated his commitment to multilateral cooperation, stating that
the attacks should “erase the concept…that America can somehow go it alone in the fight
against terrorism or in anything else for that matter.” 307 Despite his purported insistence
on multilateralism, it seems that from the start, Bush’s main objective was to execute his
GWOT agenda with as little constraint from international law and allies as possible. 308
Therefore, much of the War on Terrorism was carried out under US command to avoid
limitations from other institutions and governments. In essence, Bush was willing to
involve other actors as long as they complied with US objectives and any criticisms of
the US plan were generally not eased by compromise but by US unilateral action. The
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Bush Administration’s trend toward focusing on the advancement of their own agenda
can be increasingly seen throughout the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars leading in part to the
perceived arrogance and eventual failure of US policy in the region.
Afghanistan: Operation Enduring Freedom
Despite the EU’s statement of ‘unlimited solidarity’ with the US, disagreement
between the allies began to sprout with Bush’s declaration and use of the word “war” on
September 20, 2001. 309 While Europeans supported the prevention of terrorism, many did
not agree that taking war-like military action would be successful. Instead, Europeans
generally believed that “while US power might defeat specific terrorist groups through
offensive military action, terrorism itself would continue until the root social and political
causes had been addressed- a long-term project under the best circumstances, and
certainly not one that could be accomplished by military means.” 310 In spite of initial
policy disagreement, most Europeans continued to support the effort and the War on
Terror hammered on.
Within a month of the Al Qaeda terrorist attacks the United States was already
leading the overthrow of the Taliban regime under the seemingly benevolent title
“Operation Enduring Freedom”. Having been negotiating with their European allies since
the attacks, the Bush administration originally did incorporate some international
assistance in the Afghan campaign; however they soon made it very clear that this would
be a US-led operation. Indeed, in the initial phases of the war the biggest obstacle for the
European allies was that they wanted to send more troops than the US was willing to take
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on. 311 This military commitment seems surprising considering Europe’s typical emphasis
on ‘soft power’ and yet Bush, blind to the “legitimacy and burden-sharing” that a
coalition of allies and institutions would yield, preferred to operate “on an ad hoc
basis” 312 to limit policy constraints. In addition, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s
statement that the “mission should define the coalition” 313 angered many Europeans as
they realized the implications of this statement, that this was a US operation rather than a
collaborative effort to fight terrorism. Rumsfeld’s statement essentially meant that those
willing to comply with Bush’s war would be a part of the coalition, as opposed to an
alliance of US/EU or NATO or UN institutions determining how to go about the mission.
This neglect had a detrimental impact on NATO since US unilateralism discredited
NATO’s founding principle and the recent invocation of Article V’s mutual defense. 314
Bush clearly made this an American war despite international support and only accepted
minimum assistance so as not to cede any control or consultation outside of the US. “The
structure of the coalition in Afghanistan… meant that US operations were invulnerable to
allied interference….US military forces, aided primarily by local Afghan allies, pushed
ahead according to the original plan.” 315
The Plan and Implementation of Operation Enduring Freedom
With less than one month of planning and little outside deliberation on the
mission at hand, it is not surprising that the US war in Afghanistan seems to have been
poorly planned from its inception. Inherent in the title of “Operation Enduring Freedom”
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is the objective to institute a democracy by way of dismantling the Taliban regime. The
optimism and indeed naiveté, not only of the American public but also the Bush
administration, in the assumption that all peoples would welcome democracy with open
arms, has proven to be one of the major impediments in the effort to deter terrorism. As
Francis Fukuyama points out, “by definition, outsiders can’t ‘impose’ democracy on a
country that doesn’t want it; demand for democracy and reform must be domestic.
Democracy promotion is therefore a long-term and opportunistic process that has to await
the gradual ripening of political and economic conditions to be effective.” 316 Therefore,
the key to success in promoting democracy lies in gradual “policies that open regional
economies, reduce bureaucratic controls, speed economic growth, improve educational
systems…[and] demonstrate that liberal democracy can be consistent with local
cultures.” 317 According to this logic it would seem that the US strategy of exerting
military dominance and imposing a democratic government would actually turn out to be
counter-effective. The Bush administration’s shortsighted strategy of democratization
through military means reflects one of the downfalls of their unilateral approach to
fighting terrorism. Perhaps if the US had collaborated more with their European allies
they would have adopted more of a EU approach of promoting modernization through
economic ‘soft power’, rather than abruptly dismantling the Taliban regime and imposing
democracy. While this problem is evident in Operation Enduring Freedom, the failure to
effectively implement democracy is apparent to an even larger degree in Iraq.
In Afghanistan, the United States’ goals were to combat terrorism and replace the
Taliban regime with democracy, however they had little strategy for doing so. The Bush
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administration’s inability to fully comprehend the effects of their aggressive military
action on the political situation in Afghanistan proved to limit the effectiveness of
combating terrorism. This seems inherent in the fact that US policy in this operation
“gallops off in all directions. It does so without a comprehensive assessment of the
threats it now faces, and lacking a coherent strategy for combating mega-terrorism.” 318
Furthermore, Europeans who had been following US military authority recognized this
lack of planning after only three weeks and began to question US strategies, tactics, and
even Bush’s motives. With the initial undivided support after 9/11 beginning to dwindle,
many European nations began to suggest that the Bush administration initiated war too
quickly, thus limiting effective planning, and had disregarded essential allied and
international support. 319 This lack of planning and an insistence on US leadership in the
war seems to stem from the hubris of the administration in the anticipation of not only a
quick victory but also the population’s quick acceptance of democratic rule.
The initial US unilateral effort in Afghanistan was successful on the surface;
however the US was far from “winning” the campaign. Once the Taliban regime was
taken out of power, the US instituted an essentially democratic government, yet
significant violence continued. 320 As the situation got worse, Rumsfeld finally altered this
unilateralist agenda and persuaded European allies to send troops. 321
Bush Administration Calls on Europe to “Do the Dishes” 322
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The issue of the need for reconstruction of the conquered nation was highly
debated at this time, with much of the Bush administration suggesting that it was not their
responsibility to rebuild the nation. 323 The European influence of British General Robert
Fry finally convinced the Bush administration of the necessity of reconstruction in
stabilizing the country and fighting terrorism in general. Fry stated the need for a
“combination of military power, economic power and institutional change…All these
things have to act together…The military dimension is extremely important but we have
also got to be about creating institutional change in Afghanistan and creating a durable
economy as well.” 324 Fry’s insistence on the development of Afghanistan to stabilize the
country and discourage terrorist activity was essentially the first time European ‘soft
power’ policies were able to make their way into the US-led planning of the operation.
Yet, even though Bush expressed his commitment to reconstruction 325 no plan was
developed and the US continued to focus their efforts on military missions.
Despite initial reluctance to cede any control of Operation Enduring Freedom, the
US finally turned to allied involvement to help secure the nation. Although the US was
now incorporating a more multilateral coalition in Afghanistan, the organization of the
forces ensured that the US still had unilateral control over military aspects of the
operation by simply delegating foreign troops to the task of reconstruction. In 2002, the
US deployed 8,000 troops with explicit orders to hunt and fight terrorists and not to get
involved in reconstruction or peacekeeping. 326 This guaranteed that the US would still be
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in complete control of the military aspects of the Afghan campaign, whereas most of the
allied effort would consist of an international peacekeeping force which would not
venture beyond Kabul. 327
US officials devised a plan to train Afghans to ensure their own security. In this
loosely organized plan “US would train a 70,000 member army. Japan would disarm
some 100,000 militia fighters. Britain would mount an antinarcotics program. Italy would
carry out changes in the judiciary. And Germany would train a 62,000 member police
force.” 328 This seems like an effective way to ensure long-term stability, but due to the
diversion of US funding and interests to Iraq, along with a lack of a central command, it
has retrospectively been recognized that the US stabilization effort was “state-building on
the cheap, it was a duct tape approach… fixing things that were broken, not a strategic
approach.” 329
Although there were clear flaws in the planning of Operation Enduring Freedom,
eventually incorporating multilateral support seemed to represent a step in the right
direction. Luckily, international actors were more than willing to help. In December 2001
the UN mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), was deployed to
“support the Afghan Transnational Authority in expanding its authority in the country
and in providing a safe and secure environment conducive to free elections, the spread of
the rule of law, and more broadly, the postwar reconstruction of Afghanistan.” 330 All
European member states except Luxembourg and Ireland contributed forces to the ISAF,
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along with the applicant states of Bulgaria, Romania, and the Czech Republic.331 It seems
the EU truly unified, employing multilateralism by organizing under the UN, to provide
postwar reconstruction for the US-led operation. This nineteen-country force initially
under British command was eventually taken over by NATO in August of 2003. It is
significant to note however, that even though the US did not contribute forces to the
ISAF, they still retained operational control over it. 332
Although the US was essentially in command of all aspects of Operation
Enduring Freedom, their inclusion of NATO, considering their previous neglect of the
institution, proved influential on the alliance. As previously alluded to, the initial
American disregard for NATO involvement had adverse effects on the transatlantic
relationship and NATO itself. It has been suggested that since the end of the Cold War,
NATO was in search of a new mission and the 9/11 terrorist attacks had the potential to
redefine NATO’s role. However, the failure to make the first campaign of America’s
Global War on Terrorism NATO’s campaign proved to be a landmark shift. Instead of
restoring the transatlantic link, the operation in Afghanistan threatened to decouple
America from Europe. 333 The Bush administration’s oversight of NATO, especially after
the induction of the mutual defense article, set limitations on the future effectiveness of
the institutional alliance.
“On October 7, 2001, the United States launched Operation Enduring
Freedom. Hindsight demonstrates that it marked the end of NATO as the
premier transatlantic security organization not only because of the US
decision to go it alone but also because during the 1990s NATO never
went beyond Europe as the legitimate area of its operations. Although it
subsequently provided a small stabilization force in Afghanistan, it would
331
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prove crippling to the alliance’s prospects that in the fall of 2001 NATO
lacked a global definition for its operations.” 334
The US unilateralism in the beginning of the Afghan campaign had clear ramifications
for NATO. Moreover, it has been suggested “if the allies began to see NATO as no
longer relevant to their needs, the alliance would progressively atrophy.” 335 In fact, US
unilateral actions in Afghanistan do seem to validate the perception that “the US is allied
to NATO but it is not of NATO”. 336 While the role of NATO seems to be increasing in
Afghanistan, it will be significant to keep an eye on its worldwide effectiveness as an
indicator of transatlantic relations.
The Widespread European Support for the US-led Initiative
The international support available to the US at this point in the Afghan war effort
is remarkable considering Bush’s original disregard for multilateralism. Although there
were many political disagreements throughout the campaign it has been suggested that in
general the post 9/11 European policies in support for war in Afghanistan were
essentially the blind support of “American policy” rather than a collaborated plan of an
“Afghanistan policy.” 337 This concept is exemplified in the October 2001 Ghent Summit
discussion of Afghanistan between the UK, Germany, and France. 338 In this meeting the
three powers “reconfirmed their solidarity and full support for the US-led” operation in
Afghanistan. Although the US at this point was still reluctant to accept too many
international troops, many European countries aimed to do all that they could and thus an
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EU-wide arrest warrant was issued, reinforcing and strengthening the instruments to fight
against international terrorism. 339
The US disregard for EU-level involvement in the initial phases of Afghanistan
was felt deeply within the EU. Shortly after the attacks the US turned to the UK for
support inevitably making the UK the mediator between the US and the EU. The fact that
the Bush administration called Tony Blair instead of Javier Solana, the EU High
Representative of the CFSP, essentially minimized the political cohesion of the CFSP
that the EU had been progressing toward and “caused the CFSP to shatter into pieces.” 340
Once the Taliban was routed the EU as a whole began to play more of a cohesive role in
the reconstruction of the nation. Nearly all European member states were involved in the
ISAF, which provided the means for the EU to exercise their soft power foreign policy in
Afghanistan thus increasing EU solidarity. In addition, the emergence of differences in
policy perceptions between the US and EU throughout the campaign and even more so in
the invasion of Iraq, also increased unity in Europe.
Imbedded within the differing policy perceptions between the US and EU was
their contrary objectives in the Afghan operation. “While the essential purpose of the US
in Afghanistan has been to capture the supposed terrorists either alive or preferably dead,
the EU…mainly aimed at bringing a sustainable peace to the region, promoting the
stability and development, respect for international humanitarian law and human rights,
and providing humanitarian aid.” 341 In accordance with divergent US/EU divergent
intentions in Afghanistan, it is not surprising that the Bush administration, who initially
went in unilaterally exercising ‘hard power’ without constraint, only afterwards called on
339
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the EU to come in to help clean up the mess they had made. This essentially gave way to
a US/EU split in operations in Afghanistan. “The EU-dominated ISAF and the US-led
Operation Enduring Freedom became two commands chasing different objectives.” 342
This lack of central command between the two operations along with a lack of planning
undermined the effectiveness of the entire Afghan war effort.
The ISAF under NATO command but largely made up of European forces, seems
to have been influential in promoting peace and stability in Afghanistan. “Reconstructing
the internal security system- including the police, justice system, and military” has been
identified as “one of the most immediate and important tasks in Afghanistan.” 343 The US
also played a role in the pursuit of this goal of stability but more through fighting and
eliminating Taliban insurgents and Al Qaeda members. In general the “reconstruction
efforts have not curbed several critical security threats to the state.” 344 For example,
“terrorist attacks against Afghan civilians and foreign workers have increased
considerably since January 2002, the cultivation and production of opium poppy have
risen since 2001, despite the governments progress warlords and regional commanders
still control substantial territory, and there is still no functioning justice system.” 345
Furthermore, the Al Qaeda organization has far from been defeated and allegedly simply
escaped over the border into Pakistan reorganizing there.346
Unless the US is able to ensure the stability of the security threats in Afghanistan
the entire mission will essentially be a failure. Operation Enduring Freedom has certainly
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not proved to be the ‘quick success’ the Bush administration anticipated. If it does turn
out to be a failure, in addition to invading the country and dismantling the governmental
structure with no fruitful results, the ensuing instability will only increase terrorist
activity posing an even greater direct threat to American security.
Effects of Afghanistan on Transatlantic Alliance
The divisions in policy opinion between the US and EU became quite apparent in
the Afghan campaign. Washington officials complain that their European allies are
unwilling to take on the military risks of fighting the Taliban, influencing the US to take
on the issue unilaterally. 347 Whereas, EU foreign policy considers nation building and
peacekeeping as the most important aspect of the campaign against terrorism and
therefore view the Bush administration’s emphasis on ‘hard power’, and the subsequent
civilian casualties, to have turned the Afghans against the West. 348 The European
assessment of the Bush administration’s disproportionate use of military power seems to
accurately outline the main downfall to the US-led Afghan campaign. As the State
Department’s counter terrorism chief stated, “winning a war like the one in Afghanistan
required American personnel to ‘get in at a local level and respond to people’s
needs…these are the fundamentals of counterinsurgency, and somehow we forgot
them.’” 349 This failure of the US in securing local support is a tactic that is emphasized in
Europe’s counterterrorism policy, which according to this logic would seem to be more
effective in discouraging terrorism. If the Bush administration had given more
prominence to European involvement in Afghanistan, rather than basically treating them
347
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as subordinates, perhaps the planning would have been more influenced by European
policies. This same disagreement over the extent of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power shows itself
again in the Iraq war, yet this time many European nations don’t simply sit back in blind
support of Bush’s policy the debate escalates.
Iraq- Operation Iraqi Freedom
While still involved in the reconstruction of the aftermath of the Afghan war, in
March 2003, the Bush administration continued to advance the Global War on Terror by
launching Operation Iraqi Freedom. Bush’s war in Iraq seems to have replicated the
mistakes made in Afghanistan yet to an even higher degree. The basic failure of the USled effort in effectively instituting democracy and ensuring stability in Iraq has
discredited the image and influence of the US not only among Iraqi civilians but also
among much of the rest of the world. This has thus caused what little international
support the US did have for military operations to dwindle and although many European
states have stepped up to the task of post-war reconstruction, their view of the US effort
and subsequent failure has been based on the premise “we told you so.” 350
Bush’s Unilateral Path to War
It seems that regime change in Iraq has been on the Bush administration’s agenda
since he took office, but as Condoleezza Rice suggested, there wasn’t enough support for
such an operation at that time. 351 The September 11th terrorist attacks proved to be the
‘window of opportunity’ for the Bush administration to implement their PNAC based
aggressive foreign policy by declaring the Global War on Terrorism. In his January 2002
State of the Union Address, President Bush identified the “axis of evil” and went on to
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describe the threat and hostility that the Iraqi regime poses to Americans. Throughout this
time period the Bush administration engaged in a ‘propaganda campaign’ presenting Iraq
and the Hussein regime as a dangerous threat to the US, purporting their possession and
willingness to use WMD along with falsely tying Hussein to the 9/11 terrorist
attackers. 352
Once successfully linking Hussein to terrorist activities and WMD, Bush set the
stage for US military involvement in Iraq regardless of international opposition. In June
2002 President Bush proclaimed his new ‘doctrine’ of pre-emptive attack which
“reserves the right to determine what constitutes a threat to American security and to act
even if that threat is not judged imminent.” 353 The implications of Bush’s speech were
clear, not only did this confirm Bush’s right to pre-emptive attack but it also reserved the
right to act unilaterally for the security of the US in which “no nation or alliance should
or could stand in the way.” 354
American government officials were successfully convinced of the threat of Iraq
as a result of Cheney’s statement that there was “no doubt” that Iraq possessed WMD, 355
along with the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which essentially presented
uncertain evidence as fact. 356 Furthermore, by cleverly putting the opposition on the
defensive, stating “If you think I’m wrong, prove it,” 357 Cheney essentially ended the
American WMD debate. With the call for war incontestable within the US, the Bush
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administration’s next task was to rally allied support for the war campaign. However, US
military action was now seen as inevitable 358 irrespective of the amount of international
support or opposition.
The Bush administration aimed to relay a sense urgency of the threat of Iraq to the
international community. In February 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell was selected
for his reputation of trustworthiness to convince the United Nations of Iraq’s threat. In
now one of his most regretted moments, Powell falsely verified the danger of Iraq based
on false evidence which was already discredited for inaccuracy. 359 The UN as a whole
remained doubtful of the Bush administration’s argument since UN weapons inspectors
still found no support of the allegations. Furthermore, withstanding the US claims, a UN
mandate for war seems to have been unlikely from the beginning. For even if Iraq did
possess WMD, it is unlikely that the UN would have supported military involvement
based on the logic that war would have only provoked the use of weapons of mass
destruction. 360 Based on this concept and arguing that military action should be a last
resort- rather than first option, France and Germany opposed UN authorization of force in
Iraq in March 2003. 361 It soon became clear that regardless of UN opposition the Bush
administration would lead the US and its meager coalition into Iraq. Their lack of
concern for allegiance to UN law and multilateralism was made quite clear when Bush
stated “when it comes to our security, if we need to act, we will act. And we really don’t
need United Nations approval to do so.” 362
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European Reactions to Bush’s Advancing War
Not only did the UN Security Council opposition hasten the Bush
administration’s willingness to ‘go it alone’, but it also exposed a rift within Europe in
terms of those who supported the war and those against it. The differences within the EU
as to when and how, if at all, military force should be used against Iraq polarized the
continent’s policy position. Throughout the war in Afghanistan fissures within EU policy
objectives were surfacing but became most notably evident in the Iraq war debate,
essentially splitting the EU in two.

363

Early on, the governments of Italy, Spain,

Denmark, and Britain announced their support for an American-led pre-emptive strike on
Iraq. 364 These states represented a minority view within the EU, where most member
states, mainly led by the French and Germans emphasized working multilaterally through
the UN using a “diplomatic approach to the escalating crisis, advocating the resumption
of UN weapons inspections in Iraq…[with] military intervention…[as] a measure only of
last resort.” 365
One implication of this policy split within the EU is that it seems to have been yet
another impediment to the development of a common foreign policy. The debate exposed
differing national-level foreign policy priorities; such as Britain’s close relationship with
the US, therefore hindering the ability of the EU to come together as a whole to take a
stance on the invasion of Iraq. The pro- ‘Atlanticist’ faction, led by the UK, was
comprised of Denmark, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Portugal, and most of the applicant
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Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) supported the US war effort.

366

Whereas France, Germany, Belgium, and Finland, the main opposition to an invasion of
Iraq criticized the US/UK fervor of a pre-emptive attack also argued that this invasion
could destroy the international fight against terrorism. 367 The growing political unity of
the EU, since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, was essentially impeded by
this debate as it became evident that despite the increasing role of the EU, national
governments would still act according to their individual interests.
Aside from discrediting the likelihood of a common European foreign policy, the
debate also impacted some of the dynamics within the EU and “created a new divide
between ‘old and new Europe.’” 368 Prior to this debate, the Blair and Schroeder
governments had established close ties based on a common view of the future of the EU,
however the Iraq war put an abrupt end to the increasing closeness of the German and
British positions. 369 Instead, the debate unified France and Germany who previously
disagreed on many critical European issues but were able to “cover up their differences
and stand as one against Britain and America over Iraq.” 370 This Franco-German
partnership thus began to dominate the European agenda whereas Blair’s inability to
balance and mediate between the EU and US undermined Britain’s leadership role in the
EU. 371
US failure to Stabilize Iraq Increases Europe’s Role in Reconstruction
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It seems that Bush assumed that the international community would support
invading Iraq under the banner of the War on Terrorism just as they supported
Afghanistan. However, this was clearly not the case. While the US did have some
international support, all of the planning and the vast majority of troops involved were
supplied by the United States. While the invasion of Iraq and the major combat effort to
take over Baghdad was essentially successful in fulfilling the Bush administration’s
goals, the United State’s inability to effectively stabilize the country has made the entire
operation essentially a failure.
Despite the multitude of warnings regarding the difficulty of peacekeeping and
reconstruction of a post-war Iraq, 372 the Bush administration neglected to address these
key questions. As a result, there was no “real plan for postwar Iraq that could be
implemented by commanders and soldiers on the ground.” 373 In essence, the lack of postwar stability planning completely undermined the US-led war effort as a whole. The
inability of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to provide basic services, such as
electricity and clean water shifted Iraqi public opinion against the US in the fall of
2003. 374 As a result, US troops began to be perceived as occupiers, not liberators, thus
making their humanitarian effort counterproductive. 375
The US-led war in Iraq proved to be detrimental to US national security,
facilitating the breeding of terrorists based on US aggressive foreign policy. “By the end
of 2004, the US intelligence community would conclude that the invasion had turned Iraq
into a new breeding ground for a fresh generation of tougher, more professional Islamic
372
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extremist terrorists.” 376 The Bush administration completely failed to address the postwar
stabilization of the country, which is where the majority of the planning should have been
focused. Instead, by focusing on military power rather than counterinsurgency tactics and
humanitarian relief, the United States “fought the war we wanted to fight, not the war that
was.” 377 The United States repeated the same mistakes made in Afghanistan in terms of
overlooking the importance of postwar stability. By focusing on ‘hard power’ military
tactics the Bush administration carried out many of the previously discussed European
criticisms after the war in Afghanistan, that military domination will only increase
terrorism.
The Bush administration essentially “removed a dangerous tyrant in Iraq, but
simultaneously increased the ability of the Al Qaeda network to gain new recruits.” 378
The US failure in Iraq and its future not only has implications on US national security,
but also on the entire Middle East region.

It influenced a widespread European

commitment to nation building, as “all European governments see it in their own interest,
as much as in US interest, to ensure the best possible political and economic outcome in
Iraq.” 379
US Failure in Iraq and Its Impact on the EU
Although the Iraq debate initially weakened the solidarity of the EU that had been
developing throughout this time, it seems that as US unilateralism increased and the
failure of the US-led effort became apparent EU unity essentially refortified. In general
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“the aftermath of 11 September 2001 most clearly shows European states acting on their
own to support the United Sates, ignoring EU procedures in the process. This began to
change with the 2003 war in Iraq, when a few European states took a firm stance against
American policy.” 380 With some European states, mainly France and Germany, strongly
opposing an invasion of Iraq, “the crisis over Iraq may mark the beginning of the first
serious effort by the EU to balance American power rather than merely trying to restrain
it.” 381 Thus in the process of balancing American hegemony, the strengthening and
emboldening of a European common foreign policy will likely occur.
Through an analysis of Bush’s path to war with Iraq, his unilateralist agenda is
clear. Although the US has been accused of ‘going it alone’ in the past, the Bush
administrations actions in the Iraq war have hardened European perceptions of American
unilateralism and ‘hard power’ motives. Even among the Iraq coalition allies of Britain
and Poland, “two-thirds of these countries’ populations agree that US unilateralism is an
important threat.” 382 In addition to the ‘coalition of the willing’s’ negative perception of
US unilateralism as a threat, European nations that did not support the US-led effort in
Iraq felt even more strongly. “Nearly nine in ten French and Germans…perceive the
threat of US unilateralism as comparable to the threats represented by North Korea’s or
Iran’s developing weapons of mass destruction.” 383 This comparison of US unilateralism
as similar to the threat of North Korean and Iranian development of WMD is a staggering
concept. The Bush administration’s decimation of the US image and influence through
their failure in the Iraq war is incontestable.
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Despite the Bush administration’s pursuance of an aggressive and unilateralist
agenda in Iraq, most of the international support the US received was from European
nations. Figure 2 represents a compilation of the main foreign troops in Iraq. 384

Main Foreign Troops in Iraq as of March 20004
United States
United Kingdom
Italy
Poland
Ukraine
Spain
Australia
Japan

135,000
8,700
3,000
2,400
1,650
1,300
850
550

The United States supplied the vast majority of troops for the military endeavors of
Operation Iraqi Freedom while most of the international assistance was directed for
peacekeeping operations. However, due to deficient postwar stabilization planning, many
European peacekeeping troops were faced with a job they did not sign up for. Many
international forces contracted for peacekeeping missions began to face violent combat,
influencing them to think “they had been brought into the country under false
pretenses.” 385 This inadequate treatment of the few nations actually willing to contribute
to the controversial US-led effort seems to be yet another mistake of the Bush
administration.
News that peacekeeping troops were faced with combat situations likely
contributed to an increase of anti-Iraq sentiment in many of the coalition nations’ public
opinion. 386 Many of the ‘coalition of the willing’ government’s were faced with an anti-
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Iraq public but a pro-US government. For instance, Spanish Prime Minister Anzar’s
commitment of troops to Iraq in August of 2003 was met with massive public protests.
The terrorist bombings in Madrid vastly increased Spanish opposition to the war,
exacerbating the debate between government and public, thus influencing the election of
an anti-Iraq Prime Minister into office. 387 In April of 2004 Zapatero immediately
withdrew all troops from Iraq but also vowed to double the number of Spanish soldiers in
Afghanistan, where there is a UN mandate thus making it more legitimate. 388 Aside from
Spain, withdrawal of other coalition forces increased as the faults of the Iraq war became
more and more evident. This concept even affected the United Kingdom, the main US
supporter. The rise in anti-Iraq/Americanism in Britain was a key reason behind the
Labour Party’s loss of seats in Parliament in May 2005. 389 Furthermore, the British have
slowly been decreasing their amount of troops in Iraq, with the British Prime Minister
announcing an additional cut to 5,000 troops by the end of 2007. 390 The international
reactions to Bush’s war in Iraq are clear, even the nations willing to support the operation
are withdrawing and “allies have a new distrust of the US government’s decision-making
process.” 391 The Bush administrations inability to suppress the increasing violence and
humanitarian instability has discredited the legitimacy of the war. This lead to the
question, “What will happen the next time the US government seeks international
participation in a military operation.” 392
Implications of Failure in Iraq
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The general failure of the US initiative and the subsequent increase in terrorist
operations in Iraq not only discredits US policy capabilities but at the same time fortifies
the EU foreign policy values. European officials, as previously discussed, have been
warning the US of the detrimental impacts of a solely ‘hard power’ approach to fighting
terrorism. The Afghan operation and certainly Iraq have clearly pointed out that military
aggression only deepens and contributes to the terrorist’s mentality, thus suggesting the
success of EU anti-terrorism policies. Had the US been successful in post-war
reconstruction and stability of Afghanistan and particularly Iraq, perhaps the civilians
would have welcomed US influence. The EU response to countering terrorism is to stop
it at its roots through economic development. This policy has been incorporated into
European involvement in the US-led war efforts. For instance, the Dutch led task force in
Afghanistan has “shunned combat. Its counterinsurgency tactics emphasize efforts to
improve Afghan living conditions and self-governance, rather than hunting the Taliban’s
fighters. Bloodshed is out. Reconstruction, mentoring and diplomacy are in.” 393 The
Dutch also used these less aggressive tactics in Iraq and advanced the agrument that their
soldiers faced less violence and had better civilian relations than American units. 394
Furthermore, the Dutch affirm that too much aggression is counterproductive, “civilian
deaths and property damage caused by American tactics in Iraq and Afghanistan…have
hardened villagers’ attitudes, which helps the insurgents with recruiting, intelligence and
protection.” 395 The Bush administration’s aggressive tactics in the Global War on Terror
have seemingly only increased the prevalence of terrorism and deepened those sentiments
in the Middle East region.
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In contrast to the Bush administration, “the EU has something that the US does
not: the working relationship…with some of the Middle Eastern powers.” 396 European
‘soft power’ policy seems to have developed a benevolent and trustworthy image. This is
not surprising considering that in the aftermath of 9/11 the US has exerted hegemonic
policies in the Middle East while the EU has been encouraging ‘cultural cooperation’ in
the region aiming to improve cultural consciousness. 397 Furthermore, since 9/11 the EU
has steered away from replicating the US mistake of trying to impose democracy, and
instead intends to strengthen security cooperation with incumbent regimes through a
more “power-protection security.” 398 The EU seems to have developed more influential
foreign policy goals in actually counterbalancing the terrorist mentality in the Middle
East. The US hegemonic approach has not addressed the underlying causes of terrorism
but has only fortified the perception of American aggression. One of the main downfalls
to the Bush administration’s approach to fighting terrorism has been their military
involvement in the region. “The real key is not how many enemy do I kill. The real key is
how many allies do I grow.” 399 This seems to be a reoccurring concept in foreign policy
in a globalized world; however the Bush administration’s policy seems to defy this logic.
American militaristic policy throughout the war on Terror has not only had adverse
implications for the future of Afghanistan and Iraq but it has also significantly damaged
the transatlantic relationship.
How Iraq has Altered European Perspectives of the US
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Researchers have suggested, “the transatlantic relationship only needed the right
issue to deteriorate rapidly into serious crisis. And Iraq was precisely the right issue.” 400
While European support was very high immediately after the September 11th terrorist
attacks, differing policy objectives became apparent in Afghanistan and were further
exacerbated in the war in Iraq. EU public opinion polls reflect that European perceptions
of the global role of the US have significantly decreased throughout the failures of Bush’s
War on Terror. As seen in Figure 1, 401 the percentage of positive feedback regarding the
US role in the fight against terrorism has progressively decreased whereas the perception
of the EU’s role has become more positive.
View of the Role Regarding the
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A positive perception of America’s role in combating terrorism was at a high of 54
percent during the Afghan campaign in the autumn of 2002. As the war in Iraq evolved,
not only did 82 percent of the European public report anti-Iraq War sentiment, 402 but also
the 2002 positive perception of the US shifted in 2003 as the majority of Europeans
viewed the US role in combating terrorism in a negative light. This trend continued
400
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throughout the Iraq war and although there is no data available for 2007, it seems likely
that this negative sentiment would have continued. In contrast, the majority of Europeans
have increasingly indicated their approval of EU antiterrorism actions throughout the Iraq
war. Additionally, in 2006 with the failures of the Iraq war apparent, 77 percent of
Europeans suggested that the US has a negative role in the promotion of world peace. 403
As the Iraq war has developed and US ineffectiveness has become apparent, public
opinion has not only deteriorated among Iraqi civilians but also among our European
allies. Consequently, it is clear that the European ‘unlimited solidarity’ proclaimed after
the 9/11 attacks has diminished.
In the future the US should utilize the transatlantic partnership and adopt a more
multilateral, ‘soft power’ approach to foreign policy which would likely be more
successful than the Bush administrations post 9/11 policies. With much of the “damage”
to the alliance already done, it seems that the stability of the relationship lies in the new
2008 US president learning from the mistakes of the Bush administration to conceivably
ensure some change.
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Conclusion
…in retrospect, the final Clinton years were the calm before the storm,
and clouds were gathering on the Atlantic horizon. It was under George
W. Bush that the storm would strike. 404

The canvas on which the transatlantic alliance has evolved clearly illustrates
many transformations and unfolding trends in the partnership. American and Western
European rapport has picked up the pieces of World War II progressing in opposition to
communism, and now embark upon a globalizing world order in which both governments
yet again face a common threat- terrorism. The alliance has taken on new dynamics as the
world order has shifted. Since the 1958 inception of the European Economic Community
(EEC), the European continent has solidified into a 27-member economic and political
entity. The relatively recent advancement of a common foreign policy (CFSP) will open
new horizons for the EU to exert their influence and ideals on the world. As the EU’s
diplomatic role comes to fruition, there is no doubt that the transatlantic relationship will
be impacted.
An analysis of the history of US/European relations, their respective foreign
policy agendas, and their policy effectiveness in cases of intervention in a pre and post9/11 context clearly suggest that the strong link between the EU and US is diminishing
and has only been exacerbated by the Bush administration’s hegemonic policies. Along
these lines, it seems that America’s post- 9/11 agenda has proven ineffective in
addressing geopolitical issues, such as terrorism, while the EU influence has strengthened
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their role as a global actor. The United States, therefore, has a lot to learn from European
precedent and foreign policy.
The European Counter-US Foreign Policy
The motivating factors behind the European eagerness to play a role in
international affairs seem to derive from an aim to counterbalance American supremacy.
As the history of the unity of EU foreign policy has illustrated, many citizens were
initially against a European role in foreign affairs. However, as the faults of the EU’s
nascent foreign policy became apparent in the Bosnian crisis, increased support for
political integration ensued. The Bosnian war illuminated the EU’s reliance on US
military aid and thus increased public support for a more independent role from the US as
seen through the development of the RRF. This trend has become even more apparent as
anti-American sentiment has increased in Europe throughout the Iraq war. The failures of
the Bush administration’s post-9/11 policies have shifted European perception of US
legitimacy and effectiveness from the successful US mitigation in the Balkans to its
failure in the Middle East. It therefore comes as no surprise that in 2007, 80 percent of
Europeans argued that EU foreign policy should be independent of American policy.405 It
therefore seems valid that “America as a negative entity has developed into a potent and
legitimate mobilizing factor in European politics.” 406
Since support for an international European role has seemingly mobilized as antiAmerican sentiment has increased, it seems that the resulting EU common foreign policy
would also oppose American agenda. The emerging EU opposition to American policies
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as the War on Terror progressed is apparent even among ‘the coalition of the willing’
members who, like the Dutch, began to employ independent and in fact opposing, nonviolent tactics. Likewise, it has been suggested that an EU foreign policy would not only
oppose US strategies but it would be based on the desire to “challenge US supremacy in
all walks of government life.” 407 This anti-Americanism and its consequences on
European policy, signifies a clear gap in the transatlantic alliance which would seemingly
only deepen as the CFSP develops.
In contrast, some researchers suggest that it is unlikely that the EU would adopt a
foreign policy position against that of the US because many EU member states see their
interests more protected by the US than by the Franco-German stance. 408 This concept
does seem to hold true for states such as Britain in terms of their special relationship with
the US. However, as outlined in Chapter 4, the Bush administration’s unilateralist and
ultimately inadequate strategies in Iraq have significantly decreased EU citizens’
perception of the role of the US. Interestingly, this notion also fostered among the British
public, which influenced the British government to go against US policy by continually
decreasing the number of troops deployed in Iraq. It therefore seems that although some
European nations have regarded their interests to be better protected by the US, the
inherent failure of US ‘hard power’ global policies in the War on Terror has undermined
the efficacy of such tactics, thus making EU members more likely to subscribe to EU
‘soft power’ politics.
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American Role in the Transatlantic Alliance
From deterring communism in a bipolar world order to promoting peace in the
post-communist Balkan region, the United States has consistently played the role of
superpower not only in the world, but also in the European alliance. Whereas the
Europeans were grateful for US involvement in the Bosnian conflict in the 1990s, the
post-9/11 Middle East interventions conveys the Bush administration essentially
overstepping its boundaries as a superpower in the region while treating its European
allies as subordinates. Bush’s notion that “the globe’s sole remaining superpower will do
the war fighting of men and leave lesser cleanup tasks to the boys,” 409 suggests the
administration’s disregard for EU capabilities. However, as instability in Afghanistan and
Iraq unfolded, American ‘war fighting’ capabilities became less and less relevant and the
US began to recognize the importance of peacekeeping and postwar reconstruction in the
overall effort.
The recognized effectiveness of EU ‘soft power’ and multilateral foreign policy
values in influencing change in a post-9/11 globalized context has fortified the failure of
US hegemonic power and has actually made the Bush administration attempt to take a
more neutral approach. However, “even as America stumbles back toward
multilateralism, others are walking away from the American game and playing by their
own rules.” 410 The Bush administration’s post-9/11 imperialist agenda has essentially
unified Europe, along with much of the rest of the world, against American “bullying.”411
This has greatly diminished American power and reputation in this suggested ‘alternate
world order’, in which Europe’s influence is only growing while America’s standing is in
409
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steady decline. Parag Khanna additionally states that in the future, poor regions of the
world will aspire for the ‘European dream’ not the ‘American dream’. 412
The Bush administration’s hubris and post-9/11 militaristic agenda has facilitated
the devolution of the transatlantic trust and bond. The United States is now faced with the
task of saving their tarnished international reputation. Although this would never occur
under the current administration, the US should step down from their hegemonic- high
horse and realize that maximizing national interest in a globalizing world system comes
from multilateral cooperation and the utilization of ‘soft power’ foreign policy tools.
Accordingly, the 2008 presidential administration faced with the task of cleaning
up the mess left behind by the Bush administration must make a lot of changes. In terms
of strengthening the transatlantic alliance, I believe that the mere election of a new
president will provide a stepping-stone in mending the alliance. Europeans seem
optimistic for policy change with the US public’s strong support of democratic candidates
Obama and Clinton, for not only do these candidates converge more with European
ideologies, but to many Europeans- the election of the first African-American man, or the
first woman president- signals the American public’s desire for change to an even higher
degree. 413 However, if John McCain is elected into office in 2008, although it would still
represent a shift from the Bush administration, the fact that the majority of the public
continued to stand by the Republican Party would not encourage the same amount
European reinforcement of the compatibility of the alliance as a democrat would. The
fact that nearly three-quarters of French and German citizens registering a negative view
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of the US stated that it was mainly an anti-Bush view suggests that prospects for the
alliance after Bush look promising. 414
The new 2008 administration should also attempt to minimize the notions of US
hubris and Bush’s disparate treatment of the European allies. Rather than simply
asserting US initiatives, as seen in the buildup of the Iraq war, Americans should pursue
equal dialogue with their European partners. A more balanced and equalized foundation
of the EU/US relationship would facilitate more cooperation and thus strengthen the
alliance.
One of the principles of the transatlantic alliance is the shared identity between
Europeans and Americans. The extent to which the EU and US continue to hold similar
identities has been increasingly debated in the wake of the Iraq war disagreements. It has
been affirmed that “today the United States and Europe have a difference in interests but
there is no separation of culture; indeed the two sides of the Atlantic cultures are blended,
not opposed.” 415 The cultural similarities between Americans and Europeans have
traditionally brought them into closer partnership. Furthermore, it seems that the counter
productivity and basic failure of the Bush administration’s post-9/11 policies to fight
terrorism have discouraged future reliance on solely ‘hard power’ tactics; thus indicating
a shift toward more ‘soft power’ tactics. Although it is simply wishful thinking to assume
that the majority of Americans would be willing to abandon US military hegemony for
multilateral negotiations, it does seem that an increasing consistency of interests between
the EU and US are developing out of the failure of ‘hard power’ in the Middle East.
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In analyzing the European Union’s advancement toward a Common Foreign
Security Policy the obstacles to this unity are evident. However, it seems that the
European realization of Bush’s unilateral and imperialistic policy, combined with the
inability of the US to stabilize the region, has decreased the view of the US international
role. This, along with the relative effectiveness of EU tactics in the region, has increased
public support for EU foreign policy thus progressing toward common European ‘soft
power’ policies and multilateralism.
Post-9/11 analysis of intervention clearly represents the United States’ strong
military capacity but lack of legitimizing ‘soft power’ authority. On the other hand, post9/11 EU objectives have suggested Europe’s military weakness but have the legitimizing
power of morality and international law. 416 Assuming the strengthening of relations, as
previously outlined in the suggested policies for the 2008 US presidential administration.
In the future, with the EU and US possessing the tactical strength of that which the other
lacks, a coordination of resources would presumably optimize their effectiveness as
global actors and begin the refortification of the transatlantic alliance.
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